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South Sudan became the newest country in the world in January 2011, after 22 years of civil 
war between the Khartoum-based government of Sudan and the Sudanese People’s Liberation 
Army (SPLA) of the south—the longest of all armed conflicts on the African continent. There 
is a stark contrast between the rhetoric of post-war unity and peace and the realities of 
heightened tensions on the ground; the United Nations has warned that escalating inter-ethnic 
violence threatens to destabilize the country and many regions in South Sudan have 
“plummeted into self-perpetuating cycles of violence, cattleraiding, banditry and loss of 
human life. Jonglei state has seen some of the most extreme violence in South Sudan; the Lou 
Nuer, Murle, and Dinka in Jonglei raid and retaliate back and forth, killing civilians, 
abducting women and children, and talking cattle. Abductions of women have historically 
been a part of cattleraiding, but only recently became used extensively as a tool of war, either 
as an “attempt to directly recover wives” or purely to retaliate. The conflict in Jonglei is a 
“complex and murky situation to untangle” without one definitive explanation, and the timing 
and context of many events have contributed to its continuation. In order to create lasting 
peace in South Sudan, it is imperative to look critically at the complex layers of the driving 
factors of the recent inter-ethnic conflict in the region. An inductive mixed approach was used 
during research, including an extensive qualitative analysis of existing academic literature, 
news articles, and NGO reports, and peace conferences transcripts to explain the root of the 
conflict in Jonglei state, and the role of ethnic divisions in perpetuating the conflict; to 
understand the role of women in the conflict as mothers, as daughters, as brides-to-be, and as 
wives; to explore “abductions”, both their position in the conflict and the way in which they 
were addressed in the peace process; and to begin an analysis of the roles of women in 
peacebuilding in South Sudan, particularly in recent Jonglei peace processes. Interviews of 
government officials, youth leaders, academics, activists, participants in the peace 
conferences and gender experts in South Sudan were conducted in South Sudan in September, 
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To the brilliant, bold, and courageous women who work to bring peace and reconciliation to 





“I am a woman, and I do not go to war to kill.  I am a woman who bears children, and you are 
all my children, Dinka and Nuer, all of you are all my children.  When Mabior [a bull] was 
killed on Saturday, it was a male that had to be sacrificed.  A female is never kiled in 
sacrifice. Only the male was killed.  Now we must bring a second Mabior, a great white bull 
in all its power.  We will also bring a white hieffer that has never given birth.  This Nyanyaar 
will unite with the bull Mabior, female and male, and together they will produce the children 
of the New [South] Sudan, the new generation.   Finally, I will say this.  When Mabior was 
about to be killed, he was very fierce.  We women, we joined in, slapping our hands against 
our thighs as we would rarely do.  We united together to pull him down, and sacrificed 








                                                     
1 Mother Sadia Mangok, speaking at the Dinka Nuer West Bank Peace & Reconciliation Conference in Wunlit, March 1999, 












Jonglei State, South Sudan 
The ten provinces forming South Sudan cover a vast region (approximately 600,000 km²), 
and there are there are several hundred different ethnic groups, the largest of which are the 
Dinka (40%), Nuer (20%), Bari, Shilluk and Azande. In addition to the main languages of 
English and Juba Arabic, over 400 different dialects are spoken in the region.2 Jonglei State, 
in South Sudan’s south east, is the largest and most populous state. Jonglei borders Ethiopia 
in the east, Unity state at the north east, Upper Nile state north east, Kenya in the south, 
Eastern Equatoria in the south east, Central Equatoria in the west and Lakes state in the north. 
Jonglei is inhabited by six Nilotic ethnic groups, namely Nuer, Dinka, Anyuak, Murle, 
Kachipo and Jieh. The state consists of eleven counties and has a population of 1.2 
million,391% of whom live in rural areas.4 Almost half of the population (48%) in Jonglei 
lives below the poverty line, 5  and in 2012 over 65% of households suffered from food 
insecurity.6 
                                                     
2 Henri Myrttinen & Kate McInturff, Gender, Small Arms and Development: The Case of Southern Sudan, Peacebuild: the 
Gender and Peacebuilding Working Group and The Small Arms Working Group, 2008. 
3 Republic of South Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Commission website, accessed on 14/2/2013 at 
http://www.ssddrc.org/states/jonglei.html. 
4 South Sudan National Baseline Household Survey, 2009. 
5 Ibid. 












“It is normally said that one hand cannot clap alone. That means that we need both sexes 
to reconstruct this very vast land.” 7 
Chapter 1 | Introduction  
South Sudan became the newest country in the world through a referendum to secede from 
Sudan in January 2011, amidst joyous celebrations and proclamations that peace had finally 
come to the newly formed nation. South Sudan has claimed it will shape itself “with a 
commitment to respect the human rights, human dignity and fundamental freedom of all 
people”.8 However, there is a stark contrast between the rhetoric of post-war unity and peace 
and the realities of heightened tensions on the ground;9 the United Nations (UN) Secretary 
General Ban-ki Moon has warned that escalating inter-ethnic violence threatens to destabilize 
the country10  and many regions in South Sudan have “plummeted into self-perpetuating 
cycles of violence, cattleraiding, banditry and loss of human life.”11   According to Geneva-
based Small Arms Survey’s Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA), competition for 
land and natural resources coupled with poor governance gives rise to insecurity and causes 
inter-ethnic clashes.12 Pastoral violence between migratory nomadic groups and sedentary 
farmers affects Unity State, Eastern Equatoria, Jonglei and Upper Nile. Eastern and Western 
Equatoria, Jonglei and Upper Nile are further affected by spill-over from conflicts in 
neighbouring countries, both from armed groups such as the Ugandan LRA —which based its 
operations out of Western Equatoria before 2005—and as a result of cross-border pastoral 
violence. 
Jonglei state has seen some of the most extreme violence in South Sudan; cattle-camp youth 
from the Lou Nuer, Murle, and Dinka ethnic groups in Jonglei raid and retaliate back and 
forth, killing civilians, abducting women and children, and taking cattle. The age old tradition 
of cattleraiding among ethnic groups has become increasingly prevalent as a result of a lack 
of social and physical infrastructure and a lack of viable economic alternatives. At the same 
                                                     
7 Hilde F. Johnson, Norwegian Minister of International Development, during the introductory speech at the International Donors 
Conference for Sudan in Oslo, cited in Karen Karamé, Sudanese Women and the Peace Process: Priorities and 
Recommendations for Women’s Inclusion and Empowerment, Oslo Conference, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 13-
15 January 2005. 
8 Declaration 2, South Sudan Declaration of Independence, 2011. 
9 Jon Bennet, Sara Pantuliano, Wendy Fenton, Anthony Vaux, Chris Barnett and Emery Brusset, Aiding the Peace: A Multi-
donor Evaluation of Support to Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities in Southern Sudan 2005-2010, Netherlands 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, IATD  Ltd., United Kingdom, December 2010.  
10 United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), In Sudan, August 2009 — Defining Abyei, Secretary General’s Report, 31 
August 2009. 
11 Clement Ochan, Responding to Violence in Ikotos County, South Sudan: Government and Local Efforts to Restore Order, 
Feinstein International Center at Tufts University, 2007. 
12 Claire McEvoy & Ryan Murray, ‘Gauging Fear and Insecurity: Perspectives on Armed Violence in Eastern Equatoria and 
Turkana North’, Human Security Baseline Assessment, Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development 












time the cattle raids have become more lethal due to increasingly bitter inter-ethnic relations, 
the prevalence of small arms, and political dynamics.13 Ethnic and political dynamics are 
intertwined, 14  and smaller ethnic groups who feel politically marginalised—such as the 
Murle—often fight with larger ethnic groups—like Nuer and Dinka—who dominate the 
political space; furthermore, political battles  are often used as opportunities to raid cattle 
from neighbouring ethnic groups. Cattle-camp youth play a leading role in this violence.  
At the heart of the conflict has been the growing number of abductions of women and 
children who are taken captive, without recourse to courts or the law. The value they 
command in a patriarchal economy based on cattle wealth is linked to their fertility, their 
bride-price, and the practices of arranged and forced marriage. Abductions of women by male 
cattle-camp youth have historically been a part of cattleraiding, but only recently became used 
extensively as a tool of war, either as an “attempt to directly recover wives” or purely to 
retaliate.15 Although the practice of abduction is recognised as a form of sexual slavery in 
international law, in the conflict few attempts have been made to arrest perpetrators, even 
though abduction, forced marriage and rape are illegal under the penal code in South Sudan.  
Ten years after a series of reconciliation conferences attempting to end the cycle of 
violence,16 thousands of people were killed and hundreds of women were abducted in Jonglei 
state in retaliatory attacks between the Lou Nuer and Murle communities in 2009. More 
reconciliation conferences followed, but not only were women not allowed to participate in 
the conferences, the issue of abductions and sexual violence was not addressed.17 Women 
were returned home as a result of the conferences, but their male abductors were not held 
accountable.  
Since 2009, inter-ethnic violence has continued to escalate. At the end of 2011 an estimated 
6,000 – 8,000 armed youth, primarily Lou Nuer, launched a series of attacks over 12 days on 
Murle communities, in retaliation for a Murle raid in Pieri a few months earlier in which over 
400 people were killed and almost half of the houses in the town destroyed.18 Smaller groups 
of Murle launched counter attacks. Over two thousand people were killed and hundreds of 
women and children were abducted.19   The United Nations states that more than 2,600 
                                                     
13 Small Arms Survey (3 June 2010), Small Arms Survey 2010: Gangs, Groups, and Guns, Cambridge University Press, p. 286. 
ISBN 978-0-521-19711-3. 
14 Ibid, pg 6. 
15 United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), Incidents of Inter-Communal Violence in Jonglei State, June 2012. 
16 See chapter on The Wunlit and Liliir Peace Conferences, 1999 and 2000. 
17 Anyieth M D’Awol, ‘’Sibu ana, sibu ana’ (‘leave me, leave me’): Survivors of Sexual Violence in South Sudan’, in Friederike 
Bubenzer and Orly Stern (ed.), Hope, Pain and Patience, the Lives of Women in South Sudan, IJR, Cape Town, 2011. 
18 MSF Condemns Large Scale Attacks on Civilians in South Sudan Hundreds Of Deaths Reported; MSF Facilities Burned And 
Looted. 












raiding-related deaths were reported in Jonglei from January 2011 to September 2012, and 
account for more than half of reported deaths in South Sudan.20 The government-led peace 
process laid a positive foundation for peacebuilding and reconciliation in Jonglei, but violent 
raids are continuing.  
On February 8, 2013, over 100 people were killed in Jonglei in a rebel group’s (David Yau 
Yau’s militia, comprised primarily of Murle) attack on a group of 3,000 Nuer people moving 
with their cattle towards a river to find better grazing. According to Al Jazeera “The attackers 
left with cattle and hundreds of children and women who have not reported back to the 
village.”21 In retaliation, armed Nuer youth entered Murleland in mid-July 2013; although 
casualties are still unknown, an estimated 120,000 Murle have been displaced. An attack, 
allegedly by Yau Yau loyalists, on 3 cattlecamps in Twïc East on October 20, 2013 resulted 
in the deaths of at least 78 Dinka people, and scores are still unaccounted for. 
The recent escalation of violence is a result of a legacy of mistrust between ethnic groups 
along wartime political and military fault lines.22  Beginning in 1983, Khartoum supported 
militias in Southern Sudan to fight the SPLA, playing on already established inter-communal 
divisions, and reinforcing existing antagonistic identity misunderstandings and 
disapprobation. These negative perceptions of ethnic identities continue today, and have risen 
to “threats of annihilation and elimination through hate messaging, particularly against the 
Murle.”23  
South Sudan has been decimated by 22 years of civil war between the Khartoum-based 
government of Sudan and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) of the south—the 
longest of all armed conflicts on the African continent—during which two million people 
died and four million were displaced. In 2005, a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was 
signed ending the war and giving South Sudan the right to self-determination. After the “long 
and heroic struggle of our people for justice, freedom, equality, human dignity and political 
and economic emancipation”,24 South Sudan’s infrastructure is nearly non-existent and it’s 
people are tormented by lack of education, lack of access to healthcare, and psychosocial 
trauma from years of war. In 2010, over 4.3 million people (half of the population) required 
food aid, and there was a 15% malnutrition rate25 and acute poverty. Most of the physical and 
                                                     
20 Michael Onyiego, ‘South Sudan Cattle Clash: 103 Said Killed In Livestock Raid’, Huffington Post, 10 February, 2013. 
21 Al Jazeera, ‘More than 100 dead in South Sudan cattle raid,’ Al Jazeera, 11 February 2013. 
22 Ibid., p. 6. 
23 United Nations Mission in South Sudan, Incidents of Inter-Communal Violence in Jonglei State, June 2012. 
24 South Sudan Declaration of Independence, 2011. 












administrative infrastructure has been destroyed, and South Sudanese barely have access to 
essential goods and services. 
Women suffer greater than men from the lack of access to basic services and provisions. Lack 
of education, lack of access to health services, and early marriages (from 12 years) combine 
to result in extremely high rates of infant mortality (102 per 1,000 live births) and the highest 
maternal mortality rate in the world (2,054 per 100,000 live births).26 South Sudanese society 
is historically strongly patriarchal, and women are severely oppressed. Despite a National 
Gender Policy (NGP) and the Government of the Republic of South Sudan’s (GRSS’s) efforts 
towards empowerment, “this deeply patriarchal society is strongly resistant to changes aimed 
at empowering women.”27 In South Sudan women are still considered ‘property,’ owned or 
controlled by men - typically fathers, then husbands.28 They are not allowed to legally inherit 
or own property or land, and so have no ability to be self-reliant or economically 
independent.29 While the civil war resulted in a generally low level of education for both men 
and women, the gender disparity is acute. Ninety two percent of South Sudanese women 
cannot read and write.30According to Lise Grande, the former UN Deputy Resident and 
childbirth than of finishing school.31 Forced marriages and early marriages are cited by many 
to be the primary cause of a high female dropout rate. This is rooted in a culture that sees girls 
and women as ‘economic resources’ whose bride price can be a significant source of income 
for the family.32 The practice of bride-price and the need to increase cattle wealth to marry is 
integral to the causes of the conflict in Jonglei, as are the roles of women both as victims of 
abductions and other gender based violations in the conflict, and often as active supporters of 
their own communities’ raids. Understanding and acknowledging women’s importance by 
providing an opportunity for women’s increased participation in peace processes and in 
peacebuilding and reconciliation initiatives can be extremely useful to promote peace.  
The Government of South Sudan brought community leaders together through a recent series 
of peace talks culminating at the May 2012 All-Jonglei Peace Conference. While women 
were represented at these conferences, their representation was nominal, and their voice was 
not given equal attention. Thirty three abductions of women were mentioned in the 
recommendations, but were only minimally addressed in the conference dialogue, receiving 
                                                     
26 Joint Donor Team, “Factsheet — Gender Equality”, Joint Donor Partnership to the Republic of South Sudan: Aid from 
Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, September 2011. 
27 Friederike Bubenzer and Orly Stern (ed.), Hope, Pain and Patience, the Lives of Women in South Sudan, IJR, Cape Town, 
2011. 
28 Ochan, op. cit., 2007. 
29 Karen Karamé, Sudanese Women and the Peace Process: Priorities and Recommendations for Women’s Inclusion and 
Empowerment, Oslo Conference, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 13-15 January 2005. 
30 Lise Grande, Press Conference held on 12 August, 2009. (Quoted in Bennet et al., op. cit., 2010.) 
31 Ibid. 












two mentions to contextualise discussions about abductions of cattle and children.33 For the 
Jonglei peace process to adequately resolve the inter-ethnic conflict and promote peace, it is 
important that all people—men and women—participate in it and benefit from it. If women 
are systematically left out of this process and their experiences marginalized, violence against 
them will not be adequately addressed and their understanding and expertise will be 
squandered. Although the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) speaks of 
grandiose gender equality, the minimal female inclusion in the May All-Jonglei Peace 
Conference demonstrates that they are struggling to put those words into action.  
The marginalization of women in the Jonglei peace process is indicative of a larger problem 
in South Sudan. Gender activist Zaynab ElSawi argues that women’s exclusion from peace 
processes and peace forums in post-conflict South Sudan has been common, since most 
women affected by the war are illiterate and tend to remain on the periphery of decision-
making processes.34 The prevailing cultural norms in South Sudan “that force women into 
subservience” 35 are still deeply entrenched and women have limited political voice in the new 
South Sudan. The peace process in Jonglei has been an exercise of “men with guns 
[forgiving] other men with guns for injustices against women” 36  instead of a tool to 
understand women’s role in the conflict, to address abductions seriously and effectively, and 
to include women in peace talks and in peacebuilding and reconciliation initiatives for 
community stabilization.  
The conflict in Jonglei is a “complex and murky situation to untangle” 37  without one 
definitive explanation, and the timing and context of many events have contributed to its 
continuation. In order to create lasting peace in South Sudan, it is imperative to look critically 
at the complex layers of the driving factors of the recent inter-ethnic conflict in the region: 
increased access to weapons; the roles and perceptions of women in society, especially in 
regard to the relationship of cattleraiding and bride-price, and as their role as pawns for 
punishing an opposing ethnic group through their rape, death, or abduction; lack of education; 
limited economic opportunities; political tensions and instability and the politicisation of 
inter-ethnic conflicts; ethnic tensions and perceptions of opposing ethnic groups, particularly 
stereotyping and conceptualisations of ‘the other’; poor handling of the disarmament 
                                                     
33 Final Report of the Committee for Peace, Reconciliation and Tolerance in Jonglei State, Jonglei Peace Conference, 1-5 May 
2012. 
34 Zaynab ElSawi, ‘Women Building Peace: The Sudanese Women Empowerment for Peace in Sudan’, in Srilatha Batliwala 
(ed.) Changing Their World, 2nd Edition, Association for Women’s Rights in Development, 2011. 
35 Asha Arabi, ‘‘In power without power’: Women in politics and leadership positions in South Sudan,’ in Friederike Bubenzer 
and Orly Stern (ed.), Hope, Pain and Patience, the Lives of Women in South Sudan, IJR, Cape Town, 2011. 
36 Donald Steinberg, Vice President of International Crisis Group, in a speech to UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 6 
December 2007. 
37 Leben Nelson Moro, Director of External Relations, Centre for Peace and Development Studies, University of Juba, interview 












processes; and a ‘peace-process’ that has not yet effectively addressed each group’s concerns.  
Addressing the core causes of the conflict by exploring issues of the past through dialogue, 
and creating infrastructure for an inclusive environment of gender equality, can help build 
sustainable reconciliation and political stability. 
In this thesis the author first situates the importance of bride-price and forced marriage from a 
feminist viewpoint within the context of the local cattle-based economy and cattleraiding, 
before looking at the social situation of women in South Sudan. She analyses the roots of the 
conflict in Jonglei state and the role of ethnic divisions in perpetuating the conflict, and 
interrogates the 2012 All-Jonglei peace processes to determine effective pathways towards 
authentic and sustainable reconciliation in restive Jonglei. She then examines some of the 
prevailing explanations for abductions of women and situates the practice within international 
law on sexual slavery. She concludes by discussing the country’s recent initiatives to stop the 
conflict and argues that South Sudanese women’s empowerment is critical within any long-
term efforts to stop the practice of abductions and sexual violence, and indeed the ethnic 
conflict.  
Methodology 
An inductive mixed approach was used during research for this thesis including an extensive 
qualitative analysis of primary sources, including interviews and peace conference transcripts, 
and secondary sources: existing academic literature, news articles, and NGO reports, to 
analyse the root of the conflict in Jonglei state, and the role of ethnic divisions in perpetuating 
the conflict; to understand the role of women in the conflict as mothers, as daughters, as 
brides-to-be, and as wives; to explore ‘abductions’, both their position in the conflict and the 
way in which they were addr ssed in the peace process; and to begin an analysis of the roles 
of women in peacebuilding and reconciliation in South Sudan, particularly in recent Jonglei 
peace processes. Interviews, news reports and NGO reports were used to fill the gaps in 
academic sources. 
Because there is a dearth of published information on the abductions and the role of women in 
the peacebuilding processes, interviews with government officials, youth leaders, academics, 
gender experts, activists, women’s groups, and participants in the peace conferences were 
conducted in South Sudan in September 2012, in both the capital Juba, and in Bor town, 
Jonglei. The interviews were not with a representative sample of women throughout South 
Sudan, as most were conducted with English-speaking, educated, and often politically active 
respondents, due to limitations in access and to logistical constraints. To give voice to women 
at the grassroots, the author interviewed members of a grassroots women’s organisation in 












perhaps not representative of the multitude of views of many women in South Sudan, it 
nevertheless provides relevant and complex insight into South Sudanese society. 
Despite the impact of International actors in South Sudan, the author chose to focus on 
perspectives and viewpoints of local South Sudanese people. The interview subjects were 
selected based on their expertise, or their participation in the All-Jonglei Peace process. 
Eleven in-depth interviews (1-2 hours each) were conducted with mainly South Sudanese (9 
of 11) individuals in-country, and a group interview was conducted with 8 members of the 
Bor Women’s Association, through a translator. All of the interviews were recorded, 
transcribed and analysed using a framework of transitional justice, peacebuilding, 
reconciliation, and gender justice. Throughout the interviews and the analysis, the author 
remained keenly aware of her position as an outsider, and understands that there is a danger 
of ethnocentrism that could result in her evaluating South Sudanese culture by the values and 
standards of her own culture, which could have both positive and negative impacts on the 
process and the perspectives contained herein. The author therefore has attempted to rely 
primarily on South Sudanese perspectives, and positioned her arguments within the 















Chapter 2 | Women in South Sudan  
“We often say that the worst thing to be in South Sudan is a woman. It’s the worst possible 
thing. Even the cows are treated better than the women.”38 
Social Position 
In South Sudan, women face a wide range of discriminatory social, economic and cultural 
practices. Most women are denied physical and social mobility, and access to land rights and 
ownership of property, placing access to banking, credit and technology outside of their 
reach. As custom confines women to the private sphere, traditional condemnation of their 
interaction with men outside of the family limits women’s access to participation in public 
life, including their ability to earn an income and to involve themselves in the public sphere. 
Since the signing of the CPA in 2005, South Sudan has committed itself to ensuring women’s 
participation, including through a quota system of 25% at executive and legislative levels to 
ensure gender parity in government,39 as promised in a 1994 SPLA convention.  The new 
2011 Transitional Constitution has a 25% quota for women’s representation at the legislative 
and executive level, 40 and the SPLM proposed an increase to 30% to take effect from March 
2013.41 Although women currently hold 26.5% (88 out of 332) of seats,42 women’s effective 
participation in decision making positions is still very low. 
Lack of education perpetuates lack of access to both economic independence and political 
engagement. Only 27% of the South Sudanese population above the age of six has ever 
attended school, and in 2009 there were 84 students per teacher and 169 students per 
classroom. 43  Mary Anne Fitzgerald of UNICEF estimates that only 20% of pupils in South 
Sudan enrolled in primary school are girls44 while Lise Grande puts the figure around 27%.45 
In Jonglei, “they don’t have an education. They don’t have an opportunity for an education 
because there are no schools, literally.” 46   In more ‘urban’ areas where there are schools in 
Jonglei, the gender disparity is visible. Anne Lino Wuor Abyei, the Jonglei State 
                                                     
38 Akinyi Walender, Head of Mission, South Sudan, Cordaid, interview with author, Juba,  September 3, 2012. 
39 Ali, op. cit., 2011. 
40 South Sudan Transitional Constitution of 2011 article 142.3 
41 Waakhe Simon Wudu, “SPLM To Increase Women Representation To 30%,” Gurtong News, 18 February 2013. 
42 Oxfam (2013) ‘Country Profile: South Sudan’, Canada, February. 
43 State Educational Statistical Booklet, EMIS, Ministry of Education, Government of South Sudan, 2009. 
44 Mary Anne Fitzgerald, Throwing the Stick Forward: the Impact of War on Southern Sudanese Women, UNIFEM & UNICEF, 
2002. 
45 Lise Grande, Press Conference held on 12 August, 2009. (Quoted in Jon Bennet, Sara Pantuliano, Wendy Fenton, Anthony 
Vaux, Chris Barnett and Emery Brusset, Aiding the Peace: A Multi-donor Evaluation of Support to Conflict Prevention and 
Peacebuilding Activities in Southern Sudan 2005-2010, Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, IATD  Ltd., United Kingdom, 
December 2010. ) 












Representative of the Gender and Child Committee, describes: “recently when I went to Pokta 
[in Duk county, Jonglei]...of course the numbers of the girls are less than those of the boys, 
because the girls have to stay at home and help their moms, in domestic work, bringing water, 
pounding and grinding of the sourgum, and also they say that when the girls reach their 
maturity age [and begin menstruating]…they will feel embarrassed [to go to school].” 47 The 
gender disparity is represented in the county literacy statistics. As mentioned earlier, the 
generally accepted female illiteracy rate in South Sudan is 92%48 while the illiteracy rate of 
men, although still high, is lower—72%.49  In Jonglei the rates for both men and women are 
significantly lower than the national level; only 16% of the population 15 years old and above 
is literate, increasing to 25% for the age group 15-24, lower than the figure for South Sudan 
which is 27% and 40% respectively. 50  The gender disparity in Jonglei is severe; the literacy 
rate for males in this 15-24 age group is 33% compared to 16% for females. 51  According to 
Abeyi “If the girls are educated it will make a lot of impact and difference…But especially 
now with austerity measures, a lot of dreams…they may just hang up a little bit until when 
things are fine.” 52  
The literacy disparity is indicative of larger social restrictions. Although women comprise 
60% of the population of South Sudan since many men died or were displaced during the 
conflict, 53  there is still a continuation of the traditional cultural perception of women’s value 
and primary gender role in the family means that women have limited social and political 
voice. The traditional subordinate “quiet and invisible role”54 of women within the household 
further prevents women from being active in politics, as women who are not allowed to have 
a role as decision-makers within their households are also expected not to take part in public 
affairs at the community level. 55  In the absence of men during the conflict, many women 
took on greater roles in community and household decision-making.56 Their status began to 
slowly shift from supporters to providers as new social norms developed, and their awareness 
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of their own capacities and capabilities grew.57 “Women do gain from the shifts in gender 
relations during the war; they may lose their wartime gains in the cusp, in the period between 
war and peace. Thus the transition from war to peace emerges as a critical moment in the 
shifting terrain of gender power.”58 Although a slight transformation of gender roles took 
place during this time, the shift in terrain has not been significant, and much of the ground 
that was gained was quickly lost again as men returned home following the end of the 
conflict. Often in post-conflict settings, governments, communities, and individuals work to 
reconstruct their society torn apart by war. However, women who may have been empowered 
during the conflict may desire social transformation rather than ‘reconstruction’ which 
assumes a return to a previous environment and may restore subordination.59 
During the civil war, in Southern Sudan, a few women joined as combatants, 60 but most 
women remained in the villages. These households depended on the ability of women to 
provide for their families. Even if sole breadwinners for their family, women have historically 
lacked any ability to achieve complete financial independence and economic stability due to 
restrictions in family law that limit their rights to assets. Family law is based on customary 
law, which dictates that women in South Sudan cannot legally inherit or own property or 
land. This is particularly problematic in the post-conflict society since many women have lost 
many of their male family members and are self-reliant and economically independent. 
Women comprise as much as 72% of the agricultural labour force, but can only legally grow 
food on land which belongs to their fathers or husbands.61 These restrictions add an additional 
layer to their already difficult struggle to provide adequately for their families. The current 
inter-ethnic conflict heightens the difficulty; in 2012 in Jonglei, female‐headed households in 
conflict-affected regions had higher prevalence of poor food consumption,62 demonstrating 
the increased difficulty for women to provide for their families. Customary law not only 
affects a woman’s ability to achieve financial independence, but also often severely hinders 
her access to justice.  
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For the Love of Cattle and Wives 
“The whole issue around cattle gravitates around women; they[young men] raid cows to 
marry, you know, so it keeps going back. So women have a very big role to play in it [the 
escalation of raids].” 63 
To disentangle the roots of the conflict, one must begin to understand the social and economic 
value of the cattle. South Sudan has one of the largest populations of pastoralists in the world 
– as many as 85% of  households keep cattle, and most people in South Sudan view cattle as a 
measure of wealth.64 The value of cattle lies not only in the important utilitarian aspects of 
milk and meat provided by the cattle, but also in the role of cattle in bride-price practices.65 
Cows have a socially embedded value, so that when South Sudanese youth talk about girls 
“they cannot keep off the subject of cattle, for flirting leads to marriage and this involves the 
transference of cattle,”66 and old men spend many hours sitting under trees discussing past 
and present bride-price payments.  Almost all South Sudanese engage in traditional practice 
of paying bride-price, in which payment is made in cattle by the groom to a bride’s family, 
both to demonstrate his readiness for marriage, to signify her value, and to link the families 
together. Traditionally, relatives of a young man would all contribute cattle towards his bride-
price, and these cattle would be divided up between the relatives of the bride. In the Murle 
language, people who are related are spoken of as antenoc, which means ‘there are cattle 
between them’.67 “Of course, the youth are trying to [find acceptance] in their society, where 
a very big percentage of the communities think you are useful when you get married and you 
have kids. And getting married involves paying from 40 [cattle (a value of 10,000 USD)] to 
as many as you want to” says South Sudanese analyst Geoffrey Duke.68  
In South Sudan, what is und rstood and legally recognised as ‘marriage’ is often arranged 
marriage, in which the families of the bride and groom agree upon and arrange the union. 
These types of marriage are the cultural norm and are supported in customary law. Forced 
marriage, in which one or both of the parties (usually the bride) is married without his or her 
free and full consent, is addressed in the Transitional Constitution in Article 15 (The Right to 
Found a Family), which states that “no marriage shall be entered into without the free and full 
consent of the man and woman intending to marry”,69 but often still takes place outside the 
                                                     
63 Walender, Head of Mission, South Sudan, Cordaid, interview with author, Juba,  September 3, 2012. 
64 Bazette Lewis, The Murle, Red Chiefs and Black Commoners, Oxford University Press, Great Britain, 1972. 
65 Sharon Elaine Hutchinson & Jok Madut Jok, ‘Sudan's Prolonged Second Civil War and the Militarization of Nuer and Dinka 
Ethnic Identities’, African Studies Review Vol. 42 No. 2, pp 125-145, 1999.  
66 Lewis, op. cit., 1972. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Geoffrey L. Duke, Programs Coordinator, South Sudan Action Network on Small Arms (SSANSA), interview with author, 
Juba, September 7, 2012. 












reach of the law. Polygamy is legal and widely accepted in South Sudan, and young men 
often endeavour to marry many wives, thereby increasing their need for cattle acquisition. 
The payment of bride-price is not unique to South Sudan. The custom of bride-price dates 
back as far as 3000 BC, and has existed during the history of many countries. In 1967, two-
thirds of societies recorded in Murdock’s World Ethnographic Atlas engaged in the practice 
of bride-price; in the 1980s it existed in the major cities of Egypt, Syria, Zaire, Uganda, and 
Iran; and today it is still pervasive in rural areas of China and is near universal across sub-
Saharan Africa.70 In the African context, marriage occurs not just between individuals but 
between their respective clans, and the primary purpose of the bride-price is to create an 
alliance between kinship groups. 71  Therefore, contributions will come from the groom’s 
father, grandfather, and uncles, and they will be distributed among many members of the 
bride’s extended family—since in this setting the entire lineage group has rights to the 
woman. 72  Since women join the groom’s household with marriage, the bride-price is 
considered to be the payment a husband owes to a bride’s parents “for the right to her labour 
and reproductive capabilities”.73 Siwan Anderson further states: 
“In theory, bride-price could be interpreted as explicit recognition and valuing of 
women’s productivity and contribution to marriage; in practice, it often serves to 
limit women’s control over their bodies”.74 
African feminist scholar Sylvia Tamale states that there are two main reasons why 
patriarchial societies need to regulate and control the sexuality and reproductive capacity of 
women: “to keep women’s bodies in the domestic arena, where, as ‘decent wives’ and ‘good 
mothers’ they remain dependent on their breadwinner husbands” and: 
“to guarantee the paternity and legitimacy of the children of the marriage. This is 
considered vital to ensuring that descent through the male line is retained and that 
property is bequeathed to the husband’s offspring.”75 
Using reproductive capabilities to define a woman’s value is considered a violation of 
reproductive rights. 76  In a study on the relationship between bride-price and domestic 
violence in Uganda, Muthegheki et al argue that the process of bride-price prescribes 
                                                     
70 Siwan Anderson, ‘The economics of dowry and brideprice”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 21, No. 4,  pg 151-174, 
2007. 
71  Marleen Dekker & Hans Hoogeveen, ‘Bridewealth and household security in rural Zimbabwe’, in Journal of African 
Economics, Vol. 11, No. 1, pg. 114–145, 2002. 
72 Anderson, op.cit., 2007. 
73 Ibid,  pg. 158. 
74 Ibid,  pg. 170. 
75 Sylvia Tamale, ‘The right to culture and the culture of rights: A critical perspective on women’s sexual rights in Africa’, in Sex 
Matters, Urgent Action Fund for Women’s Human Rights, pg. 159, 2011. 
76 Women and Law in Southern Africa Research Trust, ‘Lobola: Its implications for women’s reproductive rights in Botswana, 












women’s roles in the marriage and ensures their subordination to their husbands.77 While the 
practice traditionally was meant to protect women within marriages by providing them with 
respect, status and acknowledgement within society, today the practice has lost most of its 
traditional values through commercialisation. 78 Practices that view wives as commodities are 
therefore abuses in themselves as they can contribute to abuse towards the wife if she is 
perceived as not fulfilling her ‘value’.79 
The bride-price is a strong economic feature in South Sudanese society and “the need to 
afford bride-price payments gives men an important motivation to accumulate wealth.”80 
Since the end of the civil war, the bride-price has increased significantly. Once the CPA was 
signed in 2005, men looked to increase their herds and marry;81 according to an unpublished 
UN report, bride-prices increased by 44% following the CPA. 82  Among the Lango 
community in Eastern Equatoria, for example, a wife costs 40-50 heads of cattle, in contrast 
to the pre-war price of 15-22. 83  In Jonglei, the prices are extremely high: in the Murle 
community, young men have to pay “at least 56 to 50 something [cattle] to marry a girl. It’s a 
lot of cattle.”84  According to the Jonglei representative on the Gender and Child Committee, 
Anne Lino Wuor Abyei, “in the past, people used to say it may not exceed about 30 cows in 
some places, and it depends whose daughter you are marrying and how beautiful she is, how 
tall … all these factors were also part of reasons why the bride price can really go up, or if she 
is pretty and there is competition.”85 Now, in Juba, there have been reports of rich men paying 
upwards of 200 cows to marry.  
As demonstrated, the bride-price is a crucial economic feature in South Sudanese society and 
“the need to afford bride-price payments gives men an important motivation to accumulate 
wealth.”86 A limited economic environment puts great pressure on young men to conduct 
successful raids for cattle to pay the bride-price.87 Anthropologist Jon Arensen links bride-
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price to increases in Murle raiding, stating that when “the members of a buul “age-set”88 
became a little older (late 20s) they became interested in marriage and they needed cattle to 
pay the bride-wealth. Such a buul would step up the number of raids to gain the necessary 
cattle for marriage.89 Abyei confirms this: “the young people also say, ‘yes, if we want to 
marry, we need to go and get cattle’”.90 
A number of interviewees suggested fixing the bride-price may stem the escalation of raids 
arising from increases in bride-price. According to gender expert Akinyi Walender, “the price 
of [bride-price] used to be fixed and after every period of time the men would sit at the 
marketplace and fix the price of [bride-price].  The last time the price of [bride-price] was 
fixed was 20 years ago when the Dinka elders basically sat down and did that.  That’s when 
the war broke out again and they’ve never had an opportunity since then.”91 While Chair of 
the Human Rights Commission in Jonglei, Peter Guzulu met with Murle chiefs in 2011 in an 
attempt to fix the bride-price across Murleland. He described his experience as follows:  
“We proposed in Murle, we said ‘now what is causing all this raiding is the number 
of cattle’. We said, ‘okay, make it at least 30’. Simple. Then, civilians refused. They 
say, ‘okay you go and tell your family, when the girl is married from the family, give 
those people by 30 head of cattle. But MY daughter, I will give somebody by 56. It is 
the daughter who is going to charge the cattle, it is not me. And even if they are going 
to discuss about marriage, I will not be present.’ So they charge the way they want. 
That’s why our proposal didn’t work. It is still 50 something [heads of cattle]. 
Because you don’t have control. He is a civilian, he can stay even where you don’t 
know. You don’t know when his daughter will be married, married by whom, you 
don’t know. There is no way! We tried. [laughter] We tried. We tried.”92 
Despite efforts to fix the price of bride-price, it remains high and continues to increase. This 
has negative effects on the way women are perceived within their families and by other 
community members. “Because the price of [bride-price] is so high, it affects the way women 
are treated. Women are seen as objects, literally,”93 says Walender. The rising bride-price has 
had a negative effect on female youth, who continue to be perceived as property to generate 
family wealth.94 Each wife is expected to produce many children to replace the cows her 
husband’s family paid for her in bride-price. One of the primary reasons men endeavour to 
marry many wives is because many wives means many daughters, who can then bring many 
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cattle to the family when they are married. “A female is only as valuable as the number of 
cows she can bring”.95  
In the bride-price transactions, very young girls are vulnerable to being forced to marry much 
older men, as older men are able to afford a higher bride-price. According to the 2006 South 
Sudan Household Health Survey, close to half (48%) of South Sudanese girls between 15 and 
19 are married,96 and some are married as early as 12 years old. Early marriage is viewed as a 
way to protect against pre-marital sex and unplanned pregnancy, which would dishonour the 
family and drastically lower the bride-price they could receive.97 Today, in conjunction with 
increased raiding, men are also marrying younger and taking more wives.98 Throughout the 
marriage process, the opinions of “women are neglected. Men create the [bride-price] and 
they want to make the decision.”99 
Commenting on women’s rights in such marriages, former chairman of the Human rights 
Commission in Jongei state, Peter Guzulu stated:  
“Women here are just still treated like objects for their family. Say for example if 
your father gave you to a man, it is not up to you to accept or refuse. It is mandatory 
and you have to accept, of course. Even if you are facing a lot of challenges and you 
try to escape, your family alone will force you to go back.”100  
Orly Stern, writing about women in South Sudan, supports this claim, stating that if family 
members have an economic stake in a marriage, they may see “the continuation of a marriage 
more important than ensuring the well-being and protection of the wife”101 since a divorce 
would require a full repayment of the bride-price. There is a common belief that domestic 
violence is a normal means to discipline a wife, 102  and high bride-prices are related to 
domestic violence: “high payment of [bride-price] has increased the pain.  [The husband is] 
paying so many cattle [for you], so he mistreats you.”103 
Women’s access to divorce is further hindered by South Sudan’s dual legal system that 
differentiates between the public and the private spheres; women’s rights are confined to the 
private sphere, and all matters concerning marriage and the family are relegated to customary 
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courts, which often reinforce patriarchial values. In Customary Law and Women's Rights in a 
Changing World: the Case of Southern Sudan, Amel Aldihaib explains that: 
“Customary law has continued to work in accordance with gender inequalities and the 
patriarchal system embedded in [South] Sudanese culture, and in most cases women 
are punished by the custodians of customary law for not obeying the orders of male 
family members.”104 
Additionally, customary law severely hinders a woman’s physical inviolability and her access 
to justice, especially if she is sexually assaulted. Under customary law, the rape of a woman is 
not considered a crime against her, but instead a crime against the man's property. Although 
the South Sudan Penal Code contains laws against rape which dictate that a convicted 
perpetrator should be jailed for a minimum of 14 years, in addition to paying agreed fines, 
disputes involving gender based violence (GBV) are often settled through customary law. In 
contrast to the penal code, customary law holds that a woman who is raped must marry her 
rapist, who is required only to pay a bride-price to the victim’s parents.105   
In the South Sudan Transitional Constitution of 2011, two conflicting interests exist side by 
side: while espousing progressive human rights and equality, it also includes a provision to 
honour family and customary law: 
“While customary law is a fundamental component of cultural identity, it 
nevertheless reinforces and institutionalises elements that perpetuate gender 
inequality and human rights violations”.106 
Customary law therefore creates a complicated web of relationships which serve the social, 
psychological and economic self-interest of men in the family structure and bring women into 
a position of subordination and inequality. 107  Thus, women in South Sudan are trapped 
between two incompatible legal systems with little power to assert their equal rights. In her 
article ‘The right to culture and the culture of rights: A critical perspective on women’s sexual 
rights in Africa’, Sylvia Tamale argues that culture can be transformed to bypass the polarity 
that exists between ‘rights’ and ‘culture’ in order to achieve social transformation. Instead of 
using a western right’s based framework that is alien to many Africans, she argues that 
creative deployment of more familiar positive cultural norms and values can be used to 
radically transform women’s sexuality within culture.108 This approach envisions a positive 
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cultural reconstruction which allows for the fulfilment of sexual rights: “respect for bodily 
integrity; protection from violence; the right to privacy; right to decide freely the number, 




In South Sudan the role of a woman is primarily that of wife and mother. As discussed, 
women are given by their parents to husbands in exchange for bride-price, and the children 
they produce for their new family will replace the cows payed by the husband’s family for the 
bride-price. Any attempt to understand the challenges facing women in South Sudan must 
situate the important cultural implications of the gendered roles of wife and mother in the 
foreground. Orly Stern, writing in Hope Pain and Patience: The Lives of Women in South 
Sudan, states that marriage is a central and vital part of a woman’s identity and status: 
“almost all aspects of her life are influenced by marriage, making this the paramount 
institution in determining a woman’s well-being”. 110 A woman’s primary social value, and in 
turn her self-worth, revolves around her ability to produce children: to further the ancestral 
line, if the children are male, and to add to the wealth of the family, if the children are female. 
There is not access to family planning, nor a cultural understanding of a woman’s right to 
family planning or a cultural acceptance for this way of thinking. 
If women’s present social and subjective sense of worth is gauged by meeting their gendered 
roles and their reproductive capacity, it was these very capacities that were notably held to be 
the most important women’s front to defend during the Second Sudanese Civil War. Dr.John 
Garang, leader of the Sudan People's Liberation Army and later First Vice President of Sudan 
before his death in 2005, called for women to contribute to the liberation struggle by 
maintaining “the reproductive front”.111 In his call to action he rallied women by encouraging 
them to see their wombs as belonging to the liberated Sudan: 
“The war is a responsibility for all; some must die in order for the whole to live…It is 
a war to be fought from all fronts and for generations, and women's front is 
reproduction…If we fail on that front, we lose the war”. 112 
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Women who were interviewed by Lydia Stone about the rallying call to women during the 
Second Sudanese Civil War have framed this as a positive policy that represented women’s 
important part in the war and in the future South Sudan,113 however, Jok Madut Jok, has 
offered a more critical view that considers the gender violence that would result. He argued 
that the “nationalisation” of women’s wombs resulted in young violent men assuming rights 
over women’s sexuality, which reinforced men’s domination over women and led to 
increased rape within South Sudanese society. This violence, he argued, was “replicated and 
socially reproduced”114 within families and their larger communities. 
The reproductive pressure women face to provide many children can hinder their ability to be 
active in the public sphere. When asked the whereabouts of a woman who was active on the 
post-CPA political stage, Akinyi Walender explained that she had since had 5 children and 
was expecting one more, and because of her familial responsibilities, she was not able to 
participate in politics as she once had:  
“The thing is she has to live within that mould of her society because where would 
she go?  She would not be able to get anywhere, you know?  But imagine if she could 
stand up and talk in front of all of those people, can you imagine what else this 
woman could possibly do?!  But now how would she be able to do that when she has 
so many children to take care of?  And she is still giving birth. So there are those 
tensions between what women want to do and what the expectations are on them, you 
know, how do you really balance that?  You know it’s so hard for the South Sudanese 
women it’s so hard.  It’s so hard.  It’s really tough.  It’s very tough.”115 
Lam Cosmas illustrated the complex challenges of navigating peacebuilding efforts within a 
social context in which women are valued for a high reproduction rate. He explained that 
Peace from the Roots trained women as peacebuilders, but that often the women who had 
been trained would not be able to fulfil their role as peacebuilders within their community 
because they instead had to fulfil their role as mothers. “At this last meeting, my colleagues 
went...and tried to ask that we got some key women from Bor town to participate, and there 
were two women that got counselled, and now when they went back now they have just 
delivered [children], so they are out.” 116  This may be because they may have been 
discouraged by their husbands, because there is no access to childcare, or as Peter Reat 
Gatkuoth discusses, “simply because the traditional beliefs and customs have made [women] 
to be neglected [from politics] as the part of the population that [only] deals with certain roles 
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such as nurturing, home duties or socialization of children.”117 This rigid social order that 
follows the common doctrine of the position of women as wives first and foremost, and 
recognises distinct feminine and masculine spheres of activity 118  “constrains women’s 
opportunities to contribute to, and benefit from, the ways in which all societies change across 
time.”119 Defining women within their social context of wives and mothers can perpetuate the 
subordination that occurs within and through the culturally accepted norms.  
The practice of bride-price is integral to the causes of the conflict in Jonglei; cattle acquired 
during raids are used to pay rising bride price, and women who are abducted are valued 
because they bring their reproductive capacity and labour into the abductor’s family without 
the cost of a bride-price. Women also often play supportive roles in the raids, encouraging 
and celebrating raiders from their community through songs and feasts. 
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Chapter 3 | Roots of the Jonglei Conflict 
 
Cattleraiding 
Cattleraiding has been occurring in Jonglei since “time immemorial”.120 Cattle are integral to 
the economy and culture of the people of South Sudan, and youth in cattle-camps have 
historically fought both to protect their own cattle, and to acquire cattle from their 
neighbours.121 According to one Dinka Gok man, cattle are “…the same thing as life. We eat 
from them and we get married from them.”122 Although strong arguments have been put forth 
linking rising bride-price to an increase in cattleraiding, Geoffrey Duke, Programs 
Coordinator at the South Sudan Action Network on Small Arms (SSANSA), explained that 
“in some communities, [society] places cattle rustling as a sports activity. So, you don't play 
to get married, you just play to win the game, and when there is that aspect of game in cattle 
rusting, you don't pay much attention to where you use the cattle that you have raided.”123 
In many South Sudanese cultures, there is great prestige in capturing cattle. According to 
Reverend John Chol Daau, “youth raid cattle because they can increase the number of their 
cows; I mean it has some prestige.”124 Peter Guzulu says that, “within the [culture], it is just 
something to show that they are men, warriors.”125 “So if you have so many marks [or scars 
representing men killed in battle] you are considered a hero,” says Geoffrey Duke, “so all the 
young boys are missioning to get ‘height’: who did well [is] who was able to raid.”126 “But,” 
says Jonglei State Director for Community Security and Small Arms Control Aguti Adut, “for 
you to get the cattle you must kill the owner of the cow. Because you cannot take that cow if 
that person is alive.”127 
Although in the past, cattleraiding was driven purely by a desire to increase wealth and to 
gain status as a raider, the reasons for the recent violent cattle raids are more complex. Guzulu 
elucidates, “it has involved politics, and also disarmament. Some people are just doing it to 
get wealth as it used to be, some people of these days maybe are going to kill for revenge, 
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maybe for torture, for the rape against their families and so on, others are going to fight the 
other ethnic group for the political reason.  All of these [factors] these days are now 
combined.” 128  These factors are exacerbated by increased access to weapons, lack of 
education, limited economic opportunities, and extreme poverty. Cattleraiding has also 
become “a little bit sophisticated.”129 The use of powerful artillery during raids—including 
semi-automatic rifles and rocket-propelled grenades: relics of the war, or acquired from the 
SPLA, from rebel leaders in South Sudan, or from across the porous borders—has elevated 
raiding to an increasingly destructive practice. “In all these warring areas, everybody has 
gone militant, so whether they are trained or they are untrained, they have guns. And coupled 
with loneliness and the rule of law being gone”130 the violence of raids has reached new 
levels.  
Raiding parties have grown from small groups of cattle-camp youth to large and well 
organized battalions. “In olden days, ten people who are from the same village or same area 
can go to lokalio [raid]”131 but the recent raids have been politicised and have involved 
hundreds or thousands of raiders. “How can civilians gather into thousands unless it is 
politicised, unless there is good communication to bring them all together? That’s why it is 
different [now].”132 Although Murle still usually raid in small mobile groups of between 2-20 
people, the Lou Nuer have organized into a strong fighting force dubbed “the White Army” 
(which fluctuates in size, but has been reported to be at its strongest between 6000 and 11,000 
people) and Murle, Nuer and Dinka both attack and partake in revenge attacks with increased 
violence. “Militarised segments on both sides of this ethnic divide have sought to rationalise 
their increasing viciousness as retaliations for abominations earlier experienced.”133 Professor 
Leben Nelson Moro at the University of Juba emphasises the culture of revenge within the 
current raiding cycle, explaining the mind-set of many raiders that “my cattle were taken 
long, long time ago, and I have the opportunity, and my people were killed, I revenge. I take 
back what was taken from me. So if I know that you don’t have any deterrents, I come. 
Please. Bring the cows.”134 According to Aguti Adut, the Jonglei State Director for Security 
and Small Arms Control, “the Murle, they were coming, revenging, because the Lou Nuer 
went, and he killed Murle, so the Murle was revenging to the Lou. The matter was the 
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revenge, and they mobilised themselves in a group and they came. And then Lou mobilised 
themselves and they went also.”135  
As the violence of the raids has increased, the victims of attacks have become not just the 
cattle-camp youth and men as warriors, but the elderly, the women, and the children. In the 
past, the killing of women and children was regarded by South Sudanese not only as an act of 
cowardice but as a direct affront against God. 136  However, according to Sharon Elaine 
Hutchinson and Jok Madut Jok, the killing of unarmed women and children became standard 
practice in raids over ten years ago between Nuer and Dinka combatants, who came to think 
of women not just as assets with inter-ethnic mobility, but as fixed members of an ethnic 
group and therefore the target of any attempt at ethnic annihilation. 137  According to 
Hutchinson and Jok, “God, it seems, [is] no longer watching.”138 
 
Escalation of Violence 
It is important to highlight that the recent attacks in Jonglei did not occur in isolation, but are 
part of a continuous cycle of raiding and retaliation that has grown increasingly violent. In 
2009 South Sudan experienced its worst internal violence since the 2005 CPA, when some 
2,500 people were killed, and more than 350,000 were displaced by inter-ethnic conflict. 
Almost half of those displaced or killed were from Jonglei state.139 A Lou Nuer attack on 
Likuangole in 2009, during which around 450 mainly women and children were killed, is 
regarded as the start of the current cycle of violence.140 These attacks marked a change in 
strategy, whereby raiders targeted no  just cattle but entire communities, killing civilians, 
including women and children. In 2009, attacks in Akobo and Pibor—both in Murleland—
resulted in more than 1000 casualties, with more than 700 allegedly killed in one week-long 
attack.141  The escalation of violence continued, and in Pieri in August, 2011, the Murle 
attacked Lou Nuer, killing over 400 people and abducting many women and children.142 
Because of a lack of effective intervention from the GRSS to stop attacks and defend the 
citizens of South Sudan, the retaliatory raids continued to escalate. Lack of political will 
coupled with lack of capacity to investigate crimes or hold perpetrators accountable 
                                                     
135 Adut, interview with author, Bor, September 10, 2012. 
136 Hutchinson & Jok, op. cit., 2002, pg. 104-105. 
137 Hutchinson & Jok, op. cit., 2002, pg. 104-105. 
 
139 International Crisis Group, ‘Jonglei's Tribal Conflicts: Countering Insecurity in South Sudan’, Africa Report N°154, 23 Dec 
2009. 
140 Small Arms Survey, op. cit., 2012. 
141 International Crisis Group, op. cit., 2009. 












contributed to the cycle of attacks that have resulted in “increasing numbers of casualties and 
been marked by acts of deliberate cruelty.”143  
According to a White Army press release in 2011, Lou and Jikany Nuer lost over 35,000 
cattle and 4,800 people in Murle raids that year.144 They retaliated, and according to Small 
Arms Survey the Nuer attacks on Murle in Pibor county in December 2011 and January 2012 
were the deadliest inter-ethnic clashes since the 1991 Bor Massacre.145 According to the UN, 
the attacks that occurred in Jonglei in December 2011 and January 2012 were the worst to 
have ever occurred in the state, in terms of brutality and destruction; thousands were killed or 
abducted, hundreds of tukuls (huts) were burnt to the ground, social and economic 
infrastructure was destroyed, and over 170,000 people were displaced.146 The UN has stated 
that the objective of the attack “appears to go beyond retaliatory reprisals and more towards 
the depopulation, displacement and possibly even the destruction of the opposing community 
and their livelihood.”147 
The UN conducted fact-finding missions and interviews immediately following the 2011-
2012 violence and published a detailed report, Incidents of Inter-communal Violence in 
Jonglei State, in June 2012.  The number of people killed as listed in the report is only that of 
deaths that could be verified by the UN; there has been speculation that the actual number of 
deaths could number in the thousands. In the report, the UN noted that their warning 
messages to SPLM/A leaders could have reduced the violence, but were not heeded by either 
the SPLM or the army. As early as 5 December 2011, the UN warned the GRSS of the 
mobilisation of Lou Nuer youth.  On 13 December UNMISS told the SPLA Chief of Staff 
that an attack was imminent,148 but no immediate action was taken.  
On 23 December 2011, an estimated 6,000 to 8,000 Lou Nuer youth calling themselves “the 
White Army”, armed with AK-47’s and RPGs, 149  converged and launched a series of 
systematic attacks over 12 days in Murleland, in retaliation for the Pieri attack. At least 906 
Murle were confirmed by the UN to be killed, including 88 women and 88 children. Over 370 
people were unaccounted for, including hundreds of children and women who were abducted. 
Attackers killed men with gunshots, women and children with machetes, and burned people 
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to death inside their tukuls.150 The White Army moved southwards in a large column and 
attacked Wuno village in Likuangole payam (district), where they settled and established a 
base. From there, they attacked Kiginyo, Karyak, Konsolo and Karwenga on 24 December, 
Monychak on 25 December, and Nyergeny, Nyam, Nyol, Nyarat Chezio, Tontol, Othogon 
and Iritallan on 26 December. At least 175 were confirmed killed, including 26 women and 
children. 151 
On 27 December, eight columns of White Army youth started their attack on Likuangole. 
Armed youth in uniforms (SPLA, SPSS, Prison Services and Wildlife Police) were at the 
front of each column, and women and children followed at the back, carrying provisions. Due 
to their large numbers, the White Army passed the SPLA’s 358th Battalion barracks 
unchallenged. The 512 soldiers were heavily outnumbered, and were ordered not to fire. They 
were able to protect 100 civilians who had sought refuge in the barracks. 152 In Likuangole, 
over three days, the attackers burnt tukuls as well as health and education facilities, 
destroying all infrastructure. The walls of the school and municipal building were covered in 
English and Nuer graffiti that read “We come to kill all of Murle” and “We come again don’t 
sit again in your payam (district).” 153  UNMISS reported that at least one of the women who 
had been killed had been raped. 154  In the subsequent days, the White Army attacked 
surrounding bomas (towns) where killings, destruction and abduction continued.155 
On 27 December, three weeks after UNMISS’s warnings to the GRSS, then Vice President 
Riek Machar travelled to Likuangole, where he urged thousands of fighters to go home. He 
told them not to attack Pibor and other towns guarded by the government, and emphasized 
that if they attacked any government controlled town they would be treated like rebels. He 
reminded them that in Lou Nuer culture, women and children should not be killed.156 The 
youth did not heed his warning, and on 30 December, UNMISS reported that the columns 
were moving towards Pibor, attacking and burning all villages along the way, including 
Wunkok, Manythakar, Manynyathing, Kolon, Kelenya, Walak, Lukutole, Lokortuk and 
Vormula.. One young man reported that he travelled to Manythakar village in search of his 
grandmother, his great-aunt, and a 10-year-old relative, and found their three bodies; they had 
been burned alive inside their tukul.157  
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On 31 December, the White Army entered the outskirts of Pibor town and burnt tukuls, the 
Anglican Church, and ransacked Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF).158 They were unable to 
penetrate the centre of the town due to SPLA reinforcements. On 2 January, 150-200 White 
Army youth tried to enter town by crossing the Pibor, but were stopped by SPLA armored 
vehicles and SPLA gunfire. The White Army also attacked villages surrounding Pibor, 
including Akilo, Tangajon, Manyabol, Manyrunen-Bolen, Wunkok, Kavachot, and Lanyaris. 
In Lanyaris; in one village alone, at least 160 people were killed, including one witness’s two 
wives and six children.159 In the next few days, smaller groups of Lou Nuer youth fanned-out 
and attacked villagers and IDPs who had fled Pibor; one man in Fertait village reported that 
the Lou Nuer had pushed people into their tukuls and then set them alight. Those who fled 
were ambushed and killed by small groups of Lou Nuer. The UN reported that all tukuls, food 
stores, and crops had been burnt, and at least 52 people were confirmed dead.160 
At the beginning of January, the Lou Nuer began retreating north with “tens of thousands of 
stolen cattle and a significant number of abductees. They were able to do so unchallenged and 
they have continued to enjoy impunity.”161 
The Murle reacted to the Nuer onslaught with retaliatory attacks on Lou Nuer and Dinka 
villages from December 27th, 2011 to February 4, 2012.162 Lou Nuer and Dinka reported 44 
attacks in Lou Nuer land and 13 attacks in Dinka land, all attributed to Murle groups. The 
Murle attackers operated in small, mobile groups, usually attacking one settlement at a 
time.163 The UN recorded 276 killings and 25 abductions, as well as considerable loss of 
livelihood, including 61,000 stolen cattle.164  
Shortly after the beginning of the civilian disarmament campaign 165  of the Murle that 
immediately followed the attacks on Murleland, Murle rebel leader David Yau Yau, who had 
been granted amnesty in June 2011 by the GRSS, returned to Pibor. He claimed one of the 
primary reasons of his return and the resurgence of his militia was to defend the Murle from 
the SPLA, as “the SPLA has lost discipline,” as stated in the Jebel Boma Declaration, 
released in April 2013 by Yau Yau’s South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army 
(SSDM/A).166 In May, Yau Yau said in an interview, “this time around, we are fighting for 
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the people of South Sudan, the minority communities like the Murle and the others." In 
response, Government spokesman Barnaba Marial Benjamin said "there’s no truth in what 
he’s saying he’s fighting for. This government is well represented, if it is an issue of ethnicity. 
He’s not fighting for this cause; he’s fighting because he lost the elections".167 
From March 2012 to early 2013, there were battles between Yau Yau’s forces and the SPLA 
in and around Pibor county. On 8 of February 2013, using heavy artillery and RPGs, Murle 
members of the SSDA attacked Nuer civilians in Walgak, Akobo who were migrating with 
their cattle to areas with greater pasture and water resources. According to UNMISS, 103 
civilians, mostly women and children, were killed, as well as 14 of the 40 SPLA soldiers who 
were accompanying the group for protection; 65,766 cattle were taken.168  
In response to the Walgak attack, in July 2013 armed Nuer youth entered Pibor county to root 
out David Yau Yau’s forces. The alleged number of attackers varies from the GRSS report of 
11,000, to the Pibor county administrators’ report of close to 63,000 men; they attacked in all 
corners of Jonglei, and although the casualty figures have not been reported, they were 
suspected to be very high. Nuer fighter Tut Mut said they had killed many people in response 
to the killing of children, women and the elderly in the Walgak cattle raid.169 Human Rights 
Watch has stated that there are allegations of government support, including the provision of 
ammunition to the Lou Nuer, reported by credible sources, which have further deepened 
Murle perceptions of government persecution.170 
 
Manipulation and Politics  
The recent escalation of violence is a result of a legacy of mistrust along wartime political and 
military fault lines.171 Beginning in 1983, Khartoum supported militias in Southern Sudan to 
fight the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), playing on already established inter-
communal divisions. Leben Nelson Moro explains: 
“During the [civil] war, I think the real fighting [was] between the [Sudan Armed 
Forces (SAF) and SPLA]; the two sides were then also using those communities who 
were also having those traditional animosities to pursue their own military objectives. 
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The security in Jonglei also has been very much linked to the nature of relationship 
between the [South Sudan] government and the government in Khartoum.”172 
In 1983, SPLA fighters began consolidating their power by occupying territory throughout 
South Sudan. When the SPLA occupied Murleland, they took governance of the Murle 
people. According to Jon Arensen, because of historical animosities from years of tit-for-tat 
cattle raids, the SPLA treated the Murle very poorly, including raping and physically 
assaulting civilians.173 Chief Ismail Konyi, a Murle leader and former police officer, took a 
contingent of Murle warriors and travelled to Khartoum allegedly to ask the Government of 
Sudan (GoS) for support to protect their people from the SPLA. 174 Other authors have argued 
that Konyi’s flying militia was armed by Khartoum “in order to raid and harass people 
sympathetic to the SPLA.”175 According to Professor Moro, 
“Because the [Murle] are a small group of people they are politically also very weak, 
maybe why they cooperated with Khartoum is simply because they are just so weak, 
so they had to find some way to [protect themselves]. Maybe from their perspective it 
is about defending themselves against these big tribes, who would be very willing to 
come and take what they have.”176  
When the SPLM won independence for South Sudan, they viewed the Murle’s alignment with 
the GoS as against not just SPLA abuses, but against the SPLA and thus against the 
revolution for self-determination. However, the Murle were not the only group who aligned 
themselves with the GoS at one time or another during the long civil war. 
During the war, many cattle-camp youth from all ethnic groups formed militias to protect 
themselves both from Khartoum’s forces and from cattle raids from neighbouring 
communities. One of these militias, the White Army, was an unofficial Nuer armed group 
which many young cattle-camp youth initially joined to respond to local threats.177 In 1991, 
the White Army supported ex-Vice President Riek Machar, a Nuer, and Dr. Lam Akol, a 
Shilluk, when they broke away from SPLA and formed the SPLA/M-Nasir splinter group, 
alleging that the army was Dinka-dominated, that Dr. John Garang was authoritarian,178  and 
they did not support the SPLA’s vision for a united New Sudan, but rather desired southern 
self-determination. 179  In 1992, the SPLA/M-Nasir faction, backed by the White Army, 
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officially aligned themselves with the SAF, although it is claimed Khartoum—eager to 
foment south-south violence 180 —had been supplying them with weapons for some time 
before.181 Riek Machar led the armed White Army cattle-camp youth, who were excited by 
the prospect of acquiring cattle, to attack the Dinka Bor in the heartland of the SPLA, 
resulting in the deaths of over 2000 Dinka 182  Bor people—today known as ‘the Bor 
Massacre’. The Bor Massacre has been described as one of the greatest humanitarian disasters 
to have taken place during the civil war, leaving a deep and unresolved legacy of hatred.183 In 
1995, the SPLA/M-Nasir split, with Akol’s faction taking the name SPLA/M-United, and 
Machar’s faction, the South Sudan Independence Movement/Army (SSIM/A). 
During this time, the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF) emerged as a loose coalition of 
other armed group (OAGs) fighting the SPLA as a response to SPLA violence and abuse 
against civilians, and the White Army and the Murle militias joined many militias from the 
Bari, Latuka, Mundari, Didinga, Taposa, Fertit, and some Bahr El Ghazal and Upper Nile 
Dinka and received weapons from GoS.184  In April 1996, Riek Machar signed an agreement 
with Khartoum, and in April 1997, the SSDF merged with the SSIM/A and signed the 
Khartoum Peace Agreement, officially aligning with the SAF and taking Machar as its 
commander.185  
When the CPA was signed in 2005, the war officially ended, but the inter-communal 
animosities that were manipulated and stoked by the SPLA, the White Army, OAGs, and 
Khartoum during the civil war remained and continued to fester. In discussions with Aguti 
Adut about the recent escalation of violence in Jonglei, reference to Murle’s alignment with 
Khartoum as early as Anyanya I, in 1955, was cited as a reason for distrust. He did not refer 
to Murle as South Sudanese, but rather as Khartoum’s proxy militia who were “relying on the 
north because the north was supporting them to fight the Southern Sudanese [during Anyanya 
1] who were ‘rebels’ in the bush.”186 This residual distrust was made further evident during 
the recent escalation of violence when the Nuer youth, in a statement released in January 
2012 by the White Army, stated:  
“We the Nuer Youth in South Sudan do not recognise Riek Machar as a Nuer leader. 
He is responsible for all the killings we experience today because it was him who 
armed Murle tribe in 1997 when he signed Khartoum Peace Agreement with Omer 
Bashir. He cannot talk to us because we know he is responsible for all the deaths in 
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Jonglei for arming Murle in 1990’s to fight John Garang. Now Murle are killing Nuer 
and Dinka with weapons Riek Machar supplied to them in 1997.”187 
Khartoum’s meddling did not end with the signing of the CPA; even now, the GoS continues 
to stoke the violence through support of rebel militias, who are currently fighting the SPLA, 
by supplying them with weapons, munitions, and uniforms. In 2010, David Yau Yau, a 
theology student and former member of the South Sudanese army, launched a rebellion after 
failing to win a parliamentary seat in the April 2010 general election, citing SPLM 
manipulation of ballots. South Sudan has repeatedly accused Sudan of backing Yau Yau and 
airlifting weapons and supplies to his troops, although Khartoum denies the claims.188 In July 
2013, the African Union began an investigation into allegations by both Sudan and South 
Sudan that they are supporting rebels operating in each other's territory. “The greatest fear is 
that it can become very destabilising as more people might follow the example of Yau Yau, 
and Khartoum is waiting with open arms, at least for now.”189 
Members of the Bor Women’s association in Bor, Jonglei, were asked what their priority 
issues were in relation to the current insecurity, and how they viewed the success of the peace 
process.190 They said the current surge in the conflict is not due only to inter-ethnic divisions 
or cattleraiding as such, but rather to David Yau Yau’s rebellion (response given through a 
translator):  
 
“Here in Jonglei we are, there are 6 different languages here in Jonglei. The peace 
[conference] was done very well, the one in Ma,. That peace has been settled. People 
were good. People were travelling from here to the other part of the languages. They 
also come to [Bor] here. Peace is very good. It has been settled since then. But 
recently, some months ago, these start with the rebel of this man called Yau Yau. 
This man Yau Yau, he is the one now threatening the security of the people here 
because he has disagreed with the government; he is a rebel. So this is the only thing, 
but with the rest of this, and all the other ethnic groups, people are all good. Only that 
Yau Yau started the problem that people now are in insecurity in Jonglei.”191 
Professor Leben Nelson Moro agrees, arguing that the greatest problem Jonglei is facing is 
that militia leaders who are not happy with the system “run to Khartoum, and they show up in 
those remote areas with fresh guns from Khartoum and money, and then they now use those 
young people…and exploit communities…exploit local tensions”192 to fight the SPLA. Marc 
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Sommers and Stephanie Schwartz of the United States Institute of Peace argue that youth join 
militias simply to acquire guns: “They say it’s a free ticket: help the militia capture this town. 
After that, with those guns, the youth raid cattle and kill people.” 193  According to a 
government official whom they interviewed, “some youth are joining the rebels [militias] to 
loot properties so they can marry.”194   
It has been argued that the youth are not motivated to join just to kill and loot to marry, but 
also to protect themselves from the perceived threat of SPLA violence; from August 2012 
onwards, between 4,000 and 6,000 Murle cattle-camp youth unhappy with the recent civilian 
disarmament campaign195 joined Yau Yau’s militia. In early March 2013, the SPLA began an 
offensive against Yau Yau; he requested negotiations with an independent international 
mediator and they refused, then claimed that “all the efforts to bring (Yau Yau) into 
reconciliation have failed; the only way is to fight him,” as stated by South Sudan's Deputy 
Defence Minister Majak D'Agot Atem. 196  In a May interview with Voice of America, Yau 
Yau dismissed the government's offers to talk peace, calling what Juba was offering "no kind 
of peace at all. It’s just a joke.”197 In early 2013, Yau Yau’s militia members were fighting 
SPLA throughout Pibor county. According to the County Commissioner of 
Pibor, Mr. Joshua Konyii, “the youth who want to keep their guns are ambushing the 
army.”198 Says David Yau Yau, "we are fighting now to get our own freedom, to be given our 
own state."199 
 
Effect of Civilian Disarmament  
Although cattleraiding had been present in South Sudanese society before the war, the 
increase in small arms and the political affiliations of different ethnic groups during the civil 
war intensified the frequency of inter-ethnic raids and the intensity of their violence. In the 
years between the CPA and the 2011 referendum for independence, inter-ethnic conflicts 
within South Sudan that had begun during the war continued with extraordinary violence, 
particularly in Jonglei State. There is a continuous threat of political violence along the border 
with Sudan, and of spill-over violence from other conflicts in the region,200 particularly in 
northern Kenya and Uganda. To ensure their safety, many South Sudanese have remained 
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armed and there exists an overwhelming amount of small arms and light weapons in the 
country. At the end of the civil war there were an estimated 1.9 to 3.2 million small arms in 
circulation.201  In addition to the weapons which are in the hands of the SPLA, regional 
militias, and OAGs, an estimated two-third of small arms in South Sudan are in private 
hands.202 This poses a particular threat to women, as a high number of sexual assaults involve 
weapons.203 “In a society that is highly militarized, where guns and force are equated with 
entitlement and power, women remain at risk both inside and outside their homes.”204 
The UN and the GRSS have poured resources into a disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration (DDR) programme as well as a civilian disarmament programme. The 
Community Security and Small Arms Control department, tasked with civilian disarmament, 
was under the DDR Commission until 2008, when it was transferred to the Ministry of the 
Interior.205  
The CPA was ambiguous about civilian disarmament; its stipulation to “monitor and verify 
the disarmament of all Sudanese civilians who are illegally armed” failed to clearly define 
what constituted a civilian in such a heavily militarised country. 206  According to Cecily 
Brewer, South Sudan specialist at the United States Department of State, weapons’ collection 
has been inadequate, and guidelines for voluntary disarmament have yet to be established.207 
All attempts to disarm the civilian population have been met with resistance and violence. An 
order for disarmament signed by President Kiir in early 2008 was given to state governors 
and the SPLA to “peacefully have all civilians in all ten states surrender their firearms” within 
six months, but noted that “where individuals or groups refuse or show resistance, 
‘appropriate force must be used’”.208  
Disarmament is particularly difficult in South Sudan because of the deeply entrenched warrior 
identities of South Sudanese men, prevailing distrust between communities,209 and because 
the GRSS is unable to provide adequate protection.210 Warriors have always been highly 
valued in South Sudanese culture, and during the 22 year civil war, gun ownership became 
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inextricably linked to the warrior identity.211 From the beginning of the civil war, attitudes 
and values towards gun-ownership changed dramatically,212  with small arms increasingly 
playing a role as “symbols of wealth, physical strength and, hence, marriage worthiness” for 
young men.213 As one Lou Nuer citizen described, the society has been changed by “the 
realization of power that came with the gun”.214 According to Jonglei’s Director of Civilian 
Disarmament Aguti Adut:  
“Disarmament was not easy. Because they do believe in the gun rather than cattle. 
Because they believe that if I have my gun, I will get more cattle. Because, but if I 
have cattle, and I don't have the gun, if something happens those cattle will be taken. 
So this is what they believe. So this is why disarmament was not easy to be 
conducted.”215  
Due to this deeply embedded and complex relationship with gun ownership, the civilian 
disarmament program has largely failed and has had little impact on security within the 
region, according to Small Arms Survey.216 
Furthermore, the distrust and violent resistance in Jonglei can in fact also be partly attributed 
to the SPLA’s heavy-handed tactics217 to forcibly disarm civilians. According to Amnesty 
International, five civilian disarmament campaigns have followed outbreaks of inter-
communal violence in an on-going cycle since 2005.218 The most violent of these campaigns 
have been the forced disarmament of the Lou Nuer in 2006 and of the Murle in early 2012. 
As outlined earlier, these campaigns can be attributed to political tensions, particularly 
between the SPLA and the White Army, and the SPLA and Murle militias. 
Nuer–Dinka tensions in Jonglei flared in late 2005 when the Lou Nuer requested permission 
for their cattle to graze on Dinka land in Duk County, and the SPLM requested that they 
disarm before doing so.219 The Lou Nuer were hesitant to disarm before the neighbouring 
Dinka, due to their distrust of the Dinka and lack of trust in the SPLA, composed primarily of 
Dinka, as an adequate protection force.220 The conduct of sections of the SPLA forces, the 
police and the local administration in South Sudan “made it difficult for some communities to 
trust them to ensure their security [due to] accusations that they practice nepotism, are 
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corrupt, impose unfair communal punishments, use torture on suspects, and rape women from 
villages of suspected criminals,”221 according to respondents interviewed by Clement Ochan, 
a South Sudanese Senior Researcher at Tufts University and the Feinstein International 
Centre. 
Neighbouring communities, including the Murle, were not asked to disarm simultaneously, 
further increasing the Nuer’s resistance to disarm. When the SPLA began their civilian 
disarmament campaign in January 2006, unsupported by the UN due to its violent coercive 
nature, the Nuer resisted. The Nuer White Army attacked the SPLA and killed their Nuer 
mediator, Wutnyang Gatkek. The SPLA leadership and SPLM officials continued their 
military campaign and forced disarmament, while the White Army continued to be armed by 
Khartoum. In May 2006 the conflict escalated in northern Jonglei and 113 White Army 
soldiers and one SPLA soldier were killed. Over the subsequent months, the disarmament 
campaign—described as “95% effective” by local Jonglei authorities—collected 3,300 
weapons, while 1,200 White Army soldiers, 400 SPLA soldiers, and 213 civilians were 
killed. 222  John Young cites speculation, which he argues is credible, that the forced 
disarmament of the White Army was not to seize weapons, but rather to smash the White 
Army, driven by deep seated hatred from civil war animosities, because they had challenged 
the SPLA monopoly of weapons.223 
According to a South Sudanese human rights advocate, “when the Lou Nuer were disarmed, 
the intention was to make the area peaceful, but the government failed to protect them.”224 It 
is suggested by Jon Bennet et al. that the selective disarmament of the Lou Nuer encouraged 
the Murle to take advantage of communities without guns and without effective protection 
from the SPLA.225 According to reports by the BBC and other news agencies, attacks have 
continued and are characterised by raids and retaliations from both the Lou Nuer and Murle. 
As discussed, in respo se to a Murle attack in August 2010 that left 600 Lou Nuer dead, the 
White Army, with a force of about 7,000-8,rape000 soldiers226 launched a series of cattle 
raids that killed over 900 Murle 227  and displaced 170,000 people. 228  They stated their 
intention was “to defend our cattle and kids from the Murle because our government failed to 
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provide security after disarming us in 2006.”229 The Murle counter-attacked, and the cycle 
continues. President Salva Kiir’s response to this surge in raids was the launch of a new 
civilian disarmament programme in March 2012 called Operation Restore Peace. This 
involved the deployment of 12,000 soldiers and police to collect an estimated 30,000 
weapons from Murle civilians in Jonglei.230 
It has been widely reported that SPLA who were near Pibor to disarm Murle have abused and 
killed civilians to ‘disarm’ them. One account detailed from March 2012 in Amnesty 
International’s report on the disarmament describes the violence: 
“I was coming from Likuangole on my way to Pibor. A soldier told me to stop and 
asked ‘where did you come from?’ I said I came from Likuangole and am going to 
Pibor town. The soldier asked for a gun. I said that I am a disabled soldier and don’t 
have a gun. The soldier shot me through the stomach [right side of abdomen]. I fell 
down and again he shot my left arm and the third time he shot my left upper leg. The 
fourth time he wanted to shoot my head but missed and went away. The soldier only 
asked the question of gun. After I fell down the soldier ran away. I tried to get up and 
the soldier turned around and pointed the gun. I fell down and the soldier ran away 
[again]. The soldier was wearing a new police uniform, light yellow in colour.”231 
Women have also reported being beaten by soldiers looking for guns, as well as being 
sexually assaulted. A 35 year old woman interviewed by Amnesty International from 
Likuangole recounted: 
“They came at around 1am. I was sleeping with my small girl [aged 4] and my boy 
[aged 2]. Soldiers shot a gun in the air and many people came out of their houses and 
ran. The soldiers said not to run ‘we are the SPLA.’ In my house it was me, a 
disabled lady who couldn’t walk, my mother and my two youngest children. Three 
soldiers beat the disabled lady. When they left I tried to put my baby boy on my back 
and one soldier came back and pulled me. The soldier who pulled me raped me, while 
my child was on my back. He didn’t beat me, they beat the disabled lady. I don’t 
know what happened to the disabled lady, if she was raped or tortured. I immediately 
left. I am afraid of going back, it might happen again.”232 
Amnesty International reported that MSF clinics in Pibor County treated multiple rape and 
attempted rape cases between March and September 2012,233 and South Sudan and the UN 
are investigating reports that 500 police who were disarming civilians in Jonglei state 
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abducted and raped women.234 Given the stigma attached to rape in South Sudanese culture, 
the actual number of victims is likely mush higher than reported.  
In May 2012, aid groups and community leaders said that the disarmament campaign had 
“provided cover for [SPLA] troops to rape, torture and kill members of the minority Murle 
[ethnic group] in remote Jonglei state”.235 In August, the UN appealed to the GRSS to put an 
end to the violence committed by members of the SPLA, citing human rights violations 
“including one killing, 27 allegations of torture or ill-treatment, such as beatings, and 
simulated drowning in some cases, 12 rapes, six attempted rapes and eight abductions. The 
majority of the victims are women, and in some cases children.”236 At a news conference, 
SPLA spokesman Col. Philip Aguer dismissed allegations that the abuses were widespread, 
attributing the incidents to “indiscipline and drunkenness”.237 According to Human Rights 
Watch, these explanations do not account for the large number of killings, or the patterns of 
abuse.238  
Human Rights Watch found evidence that 74 civilians were killed by SPLA soldiers between 
December 2012 and July 2013 in around 20 different incidents. Seventeen of those killed 
were women and children. 239  According to Amnesty International, these human rights 
violations by the SPLA continued throughout the disarmament campaign with impunity,240 
and there continue to be reports of violence against Murle civilians despite calls by President 
Kiir for “ill-disciplined” elements within the regular security forces to halt violence against 
innocent citizens.241 In August 2013, the SPLA took a positive step forward and relieved 
General James Otong, the commander in charge of troops in Pibor County, of his post. The 
SPLA also opened investigations into allegations that soldiers under his command killed 
civilians and committed other human rights abuses, and Otong may be formally charged once 
the investigations have been completed.242 On 24 October 2013, the Sudan Tribune reported 
that 31 soldiers had been sentenced in military court for charges of murder, rape and human 
rights violations in Pibor, Akobo, and Bor; of these, five were sentenced to death for murder, 
2 were sentenced to prison for rape, and 24 were given various sentences from dismissal to 
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prison for misconduct due to frequent drinking.243 This is significant in that it “is the first time 
the SPLA has charged soldiers for committing serious crimes such as murder or rape.” 244 
However, despite these prosecutions, the abuses committed by the SPLA during the civilian 
disarmament campaign have deepened inter-ethnic distrust in Jonglei. 
Disarmament is perceived by many communities as being targeted along ethnic lines245 for 
political reasons,246 forcing non-Dinka “to accept that the SPLA alone has the right to bear 
weapons”. 247  Ochan found that the SPLA are often “seen as actively encouraging and 
condoning cattle raids by members of their own ethnic groups, while seeking to punish 
others”,248 and Human Rights Watch states that many of the documented killings and other 
abuses which occurred during the disarmament campaign “appear to be deliberate reprisals by 
SPLA against civilians belonging to the Murle ethnicity, a form of collective punishment, 
which would also constitute a war crime.”249 According to one woman interviewed, “when 
rebels and SPLA fight in the bush, SPLA come back they do revenging on us. This is why we 
have to flee.”250 
 According to former Chairman of the Human Rights Commission of Jonglei State Peter 
Guzulu: 
“Even the government knows that this [civilian disarmament] is not the solution. But 
they just want to bring it as a tool for punishing communities. But when you translate 
it, they are just saying: ‘we are going to that community to punish that community 
through disarmament’. They are coming with a white curtain, but behind the curtain it 
is something else. This is not about bringing the real solution. It is about politics and 
it is about punishment.”251  
The re-emergence of the militia led by David Yau Yau as a reaction to SPLA violence during 
the disarmament campaign252 has blurred the definition of ‘civilian’, as many Murle youth 
who joined the rebel group to protect their villages after experiencing abuses during 
disarmament are now treated as ‘rebels’.  
Civilian disarmament in South Sudan is challenged not only by perceptions within the 
community that the process will have no value, but also by the aforementioned acute lack of a 
viable economic alternative to cattleraiding, and by the challenge of disarming a large number 
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of civilians in possession of small arms while raiders, militia, and sometimes even the SPLA 
continue to pose a threat. The five civilian disarmament campaigns, including that of the 
White Army in 2006 and the recent disarmament campaign of Murle, have not reduced the 
violence, but rather increased vulnerability to violent cattle raids and fighting between groups. 
As Peter Guzulu elucidates: 
“A gun cannot shoot itself. It is a human being who shoots a gun. A human being 
cannot shoot a gun without a reason. There is a reason behind it. And we have to stop 
the reason, not the gun…So the problem is no rule of law, no good governance, no 
fairness. So that is the problem. Disarmament right now, people are ‘disarmed’, but 
when you go to communities today, you find a lot of guns.”253 
 
Ethnic Identities: Misunderstandings and Misappropriation  
Competition for resources coupled with poor governance motivates inter-ethnic clashes.254 
Beyond competition for resources, the inter-communal violence is driven both by a desire to 
increase wealth, and the politicization of ethnic rivalries through the militarisation of 
identities and widespread image destruction. Sharon Elaine Hutchinson and Jok Madut Jok 
describe Nuer-Dinka “mutual suspicion and ignorance”, as having ideological currents on 
both sides of “pervasive and yet superficial … mutual misunderstandings”.255 Some of the 
common ethnic slurs and stereotypes used to explain the deteriorating relations during the 
1990s “were undoubtedly circulating long before this war began, while others appear to have 
been picked, reshaped and redeployed by Southern military leaders and warlords seeking to 
justify not only their political ambitions but their very existence in the eyes of those they 
claimed to protect”.256 The current escalation of violence in Jonglei is fuelled by much of the 
same identity misunderstandings and misappropriation. 
The Murle have been demonised by many people in South Sudan, and are “being portrayed as 
the aggressor [in the recent surge of violence in Jonglei state].”257 According to Aguti Adut, 
“the Murle, they began this, even I think 191 years ago, this is how they began the raiding”258 
because, as said by Rev. John Chol Daau, “there is something in Murle culture that motivates 
them, culturally”.259 The Nuer Youth, in a statement released in January 2012 by the White 
Army, stated “the problem of Jonglei state is a persistent attack of Murle against Nuer, Anuak 
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and Dinka civilians. The Murle are the ones who do not want to live in peace.”260 Leben 
Nelson Moro explained, “when you meet the Nuer and the Dinka, they always say, ‘it is the 
Murle; the Murle are the aggressors. The Murle have always been the bad guys.’ But the 
Murle will also say different things. Not everything that is happening is caused by Murle.”261 
Jon Arensen contends that only one side of the story is being told: “the Nuer are being 
portrayed as noble warriors simply reacting to the attacks of the evil Murle people. Nothing is 
further from the truth.”262  According to a statement released by the Nuer Youth White Army, 
composed of the Lou and Jikany White Army of Akobo, Jonglei, since the forceful 
disarmament of the Nuer in 2006, the government and UN had failed to protect them from 
Murle raids, and thus they have argued they must protect themselves: “to do so, we have 
decided to invade Murleland and wipe out the entire Murle tribe on the face of the earth as the 
only solution to guarantee long-term security of Nuer’s cattle. There is no other way to 
resolve Murle problem other than wiping them out through the barrel of the gun.” 263 
According to Genocide Watch, the subsequent ethnic massacres constituted a “Genocide 
Emergency” that had reached the level of “extermination”.264 Professor Leben Nelson Moro 
explained that the “greater utmost fear and instability” caused by the rhetoric of “wiping out 
the complete ethnic group” contributed to the escalation of violence, and the UN has warned 
that the trauma of the recent inter-ethnic conflict has been exacerbated by the “threats of 
annihilation and elimination through hate messaging particularly against the Murle,”265 who 
suffer from marginalisation and disenfranchisement. 
In addition to their small population and physical isolation, the Murle are further marginalised 
because, unlike other ethnic groups in South Sudan, there are not many Murle who were 
educated in the diaspora. During the civil war, many Nuer and Dinka youth, thought to have 
been aligned with the SPLA ‘Red Army’ and commonly known today as ‘the Lost Boys of 
Sudan’, fled the war to neighbouring countries and received education. Many from this 
diaspora have returned to South Sudan to speak for the youth of their ethnic group. For 
example, Gai Bol Thong, a young Nuer man from the United States diaspora, is the current 
White Army spokesperson.266 Few Murle youth joined this group of young refugees “because 
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rather than walking out of the country they simply went into hiding in remote parts of their 
own territory and continued living their traditional lifestyle,”267 and as such, there are very 
few educated and vocal voices who are able to speak for their ethnic group.268  
There have been limited academics studies of the Murle conducted by just two researchers. 
The first, Bazette Lewis, was an anthropologist who served in the Sudan Political Service for 
20 years from 1930. His book, The Murle: Red Chiefs and Black Commoners, was written in 
1972. At the time of writing, the Murle numbered only 20,000.269 The second, Jon Arensen, is 
a Professor of Anthropology who lived with the Murle as a linguist during the 1970’s, 
translating the Bible into Murle. He has written linguistic studies and a short series of papers 
presented in 2012 in Nairobi as A Memorandum in Defense of the Murle People. Because of 
Murle isolation, the descriptions of the social structure described by Lewis and Arensen are 
still relevant today.  
The Murle are a Nilotic ethnic group of 148,000 living in the south eastern corner of Jonglei 
in a vast area covering 48,000km.270 “Because they are a small group of people they are 
politically…very weak.”271 In addition to political marginalisation based purely on population 
size, Murle face additional exclusion “because they find themselves in an extremely weak 
position in a very difficult environment.”272 Geoffrey Duke explains the isolation:  
“The Murle area is a completely cut off piece of world. When we were there, when 
we tried to go from a village to a village, we would get lost because there are no 
paved roads. Cars have not been moving there. People walk on foot.”273  
In Jonglei, 46% of the population has to walk for more than 30 minutes one way just to 
collect drinking water, and 20% have to walk more than one hour. Because of the lack of 
infrastructure, it can take anywhere from three to five days to walk between villages during 
dry season, and during the wet season, many villages are completely isolated.  
The villages in Murleland are the most isolated in Jonglei. The “isolation and lack of 
connection to other communities,” has led to Murle not having much interaction with 
neighbouring ethnic groups, whom they regard simply as “hostile neighbours”.274 “We don't 
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have roads. And if we don't meet, we are enemies to each other. If people don't visit each 
other, they will see [each other] like enemies.”275 According to Arensen, in Murle: 
“All other peoples are referred to as moden. The literal translation of this word is 
‘enemy,’ although it can also be translated as ‘strangers.’ Even when the Murle are at 
peace with a given group of neighbours, they still refer to them as moden. The 
neighbouring [ethnic groups] also return the favour by referring to the Murle as the 
‘enemy.’ The Dinka people refer to the Murle as the Beir, [‘enemy’], and the Anuak 
call them the Ajiba, [‘enemy’].”276 
Because they view each other as enemies, according to Lewis, “the capture of cattle or 
children from a neighbouring [ethnic group] was a highly laudable act of war.”277 Geoffrey 
Duke, who has lived with the Murle, explains: 
“You cannot blame the violence of a group that existed since time immemorial with 
such little interaction and with the known perception about strangers as enemies. No, 
you can't blame them for that, because they are not connected. Every time they met it 
was, ‘come on, he has cattle, and those are mine.’ ‘Oh he has come to do...what is he 
here for? For my cattle.’ As a matter of fact, some of these community members have 
not come to discover their neighbouring community by day.”278 
As like the Dinka and Nuer, the Murle consider themselves to be cattle people, and cattle 
form the “basis of the philosophy of life.”279 Young men in cattle-camps live with their cattle 
all year, searching for grazing land and guarding them from others. “For young and old, men 
and women, cattle provide the most absorbing topic of conversation”280 and there are myriads 
of terms for the colour and colour combinations, and horn configurations.281 Murle love their 
cows individually and believe that their spirits join the spirits of the ancestors when they 
die.282 When a young boy becomes a man, his father gives him a large ox with “beautiful 
colours and spreading horns.”283 He takes his “bull name” from a riddle about his bull,284 and 
will spend hours singing to him. According to Lewis, their bond is so deep that the bull is able 
to recognise his master’s voice.285  
As noted earlier, becoming a man in Murle culture is synonymous with becoming a warrior, 
and in 1972 Lewis wrote that a man must “kill his man in war” before he can “attain full 
warriorhood and participate in the war dances of the drums.”286 Lewis has observed that “in 
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the past the dances of successful warriors, when the drum was beaten in triumph, were the 
greatest moments in Murle life, and today there is no substitute.”287  
To understand the current conflict it is necessary to look at the role of generational 
masculinities in Murle culture. Unlike other hierarchal communities in South Sudan, “since 
there is little hierarchy, the cohesive factor that holds Murle society together is the highly 
functional age-sets [buul]” regarded as the core social identity among the Murle.288 Boys 
become members of a buul in their teenage years and they remain in that buul as they move 
through life. Only young men who have become part of a buul have the right to dance with 
girls, sing, hunt, fight the enemy, and steal cattle.289 “So the different [buul], when that [buul] 
comes up they must do something to supersede the [buul] before them, to show them they’re 
stronger, they’re mightier … And even their wives become also arrogant and proud of 
them.”290   Each buul is named after an animal, and the youth wear coloured beads and 
feathers to identify themselves as members. According to Small Arms Survey, the two age-
sets from the Nanaam and Likuangole areas are currently conducting most of the raids: “the 
ruling age-set is the Bototnya, made up of young men in their prime (aged 20–30); the Titi is 
composed of men aged 30–40 years.”291 
Successful raiders are so admired in Murle culture that the old word for raid, koodh,292 has 
been replaced with the word lokalio; this was apparent during the peace conference. Lokalio 
is the name of one of the two “greatest experts of single-handed raiding” during the early 
1900s, who wore “iron rings round his toes and ankles to commemorate the men he had 
killed.”293 This change of name is reflective of the great importance and admiration Murle 
have historically given to a successful raider, and it is indicative of the significance this 
prowess has in their culture.  
The age-sets are significant, as cattle-camp youth play a prominent role in the violence in 
Jonglei. The people who participate in raids and who die in numbers are youth. The majority 
of the population is youth; fifteen percent of the population in Jonglei is under five years of 
age, and 51% under the age of 18.294 The recent peace process in Jonglei that has relied 
primarily on discussions between chiefs and leaders has not been effective in stopping the 
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youth-on-youth violence, particularly because it does not resonate with Murle, whose ethnic 
group does not have the hierarchical structure of the Nuer or Dinka. Says Peter Guzulu: 
“Chiefs are not raiding. They are too old to go around. So why you don’t bring the 
youth themselves? Come and talk. We know, like in Murle we have one [buul], we 
call it Acheps, we give them different names. Now the Acheps which are very active 
in these raids, we know them by names. We know them by villages. In any village, 
who are those who are very active in raiding? And ask for them and so on, and then 
go and collect them and bring them to the conference to speak, to convene 
themselves. And then when they go back, they will convene the rest, they will follow 
us. You bring chiefs who are 70 years, they have never even gone out [on raids], to 
attend the conference in Bor…with his weak hearing power…it will not do 
anything.”295 
Some Nuer youth, in a press statement released by the Nuer White Army, have echoed these 
sentiments, expressing that “mediation between Murle, Dinka and Nuer chiefs is not in the 
interest of the youth on any side,” and further “advis[ing] the international community to 
know that the chiefs of the Nuer, Dinka and Murle will not solve the on-going conflict,” and 
that the only solution will be “a direct peace talk between Murle Youth on one side and Dinka 
and Nuer Youth on the other side. The chiefs and politicians in Jonglei and Juba are 
complicating the matter and the youth do not recognise their authority.”296 They appealed to 
the UN and the US government to facilitate youth-to-youth dialogue “independent from 
chiefs, churches and Juba’s government,” instead of “wast[ing] time talking to tiny majority 
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Chapter 4 | The Role of Women in the Jonglei Conflict 
 
Singing, Support, and Celebration 
It is important to highlight women’s role not just as passive victims to the violence, but  also 
the “very big role of women as commissioners of this violence.” 298 According to Geoffrey 
Duke,  
“Their level of engagement is very critical in this access [to the] peace process. If 
men fight, the first thing you need to investigate is the invisible stakeholder: the 
women, who sits back there, who is the reason why a man fights, the reason why 
there is something [bride-price], the reason why there is abduction. When there is no 
child, no meaning, then you get the pressure from the woman [to abduct a child].” 299 
Women also support raiding by teaching their children to grow up to be raiders, “for example 
the Dinka women can say, ‘oh the Murle people are bad and the Murles are raiders’, and the 
Murles also they sing the same song to their children and the Nuer women also are doing the 
same thing and so on, so the Murle child grows up knowing that what he is doing is right and 
that makes him to be a stronger man.”300  Besides offering encouragement to raid, many 
women also played important logistical support roles during the recent violence. For example, 
as already noted, the UN reported that behind attacking columns of the White Army, women 
followed carrying provisions.301 They acted as cooks for the fighting forces, and as nurses, 
tending to the wounded and helping to transport them.  
The women who stay in the villages “are the first ones to ululate and beat the drums [in 
celebration] when the young men come back with the cattle, which means women are part of 
the problem. I understand women prepare food and receive them and congratulate them, so 
they are part of the problem.” 302 It is not, however, just the women who legitimize violence 
by dancing and singing after a successful raid. In Murle culture, after a great raid has been 
successful and the cattle and abductees are driven back to the village, both Murle men and 
women will hold a “dance of the drum,” during which all of the captured cattle will be 
divided. 303  Hundreds of people attend the dances to watch the warriors dance in their 
regalia,304 including young unmarried girls. The celebratory dances are central to courtship. 
The girls “put a broad band of beads across their foreheads, a string of beads tied just above 
the eyes, and necklaces. They have long ropes of beads crisscrossed over their chests and 
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armbands above the elbows, from which hang down thin strings of leather, having a knot at 
the bottom, with which they flick the boys during the dance.”305 They also wear a belt made 
of beads that can be given to a young warrior at the end of the dance “as a mark of her 
favour.”306 Girls can invite men of their choice to dance with them, and that man will then 
leave the line of warriors and jump in front of the girl, putting his hands on her hips as they 
jump around together.307 
Geoffrey Duke, who spent time living with Murle teaching human rights, commented: “I 
enjoyed it when they sang [singing, clap/drum/clap/drum]; very happy. They really enjoy 
their life. And then when I asked why they are celebrating, it’s following a bad event. I was 
teaching about children's rights and teaching about abduction, and people here are celebrating 
a new [abducted] entry.”308 Women “celebrate the warriors,” says Walender,  
“These were the things that the Dinka women and the Nuer women were asking 
Murle women in the [May 2012] conference. They say that you give birth to a child. 
Why do you celebrate when a child of your sister is brought when the raiders return 
and you celebrate and you get happy, and say ‘oh they came and they brought cows 
and they brought children’ and so on. And they celebrate that. And most of it, they 
abduct young women, you know.”309 
Some women also commission the violence by encouraging a culture of revenge. Anne Lino 
Wuor Abyei noted that a well-respected female elder in the Presbyterian church in Pibor was 
“talking about how the Nuer attacked the Pibor area and Likuangole and she said ‘I know my 
children, and I have trained them well. Now, if I am killed, I know they will avenge me forty 
times.’”310  At a reconciliation conference in Wunlit, a woman threatened cannibalism as 
revenge for raiding, saying “once you are caught, you thieves, since you are the ones 
confusing people, even though people don't eat other human beings, we will eat you. This will 
be an example to all thieves, encouraging them to stop robbing others”.311 
Women have historically had a significant role in the cultural practice of revenge. In Murle 
culture, while all other social institutions are patrilineal, the ‘institution of the feud’ is 
organized on a matrilineal basis.312 If a man is killed, it is the duty of his feud-kin to avenge 
him, “either by killing the perpetrator himself, or a member of his feud kin, or by securing the 
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payment of compensation.”313 The feud-kin are comprised of those members of the man’s 
family descended in the female line from his maternal grandmother.314 According to Lewis, 
compensation historically involved a child being handed over ceremonially to the chief and 
this child would take the place and name of the deceased in the family.315 The children 
usually came from Dinka “incest-children” who were purchased by the Murle in exchange for 
cattle.316 In 1943, after complaints about the “Murle trade in Dinka ‘incest children’”, Lewis 
proposed that the Murle adopt the Nuer system of paying the blood compensation in cattle.317 
The cattle would be provided by the perpetrator to pay bride-price for a woman to marry the 
“ghost of the deceased,” who would then bear him children to continue his line.318  
While Lewis encouraged the Murle to stop using children for compensation, he promoted a 
practice that instead victimised women. The practice of using a woman for compensation has 
continued, and women are ‘sold’ not just to produce children to replace a deceased man, but 
also to facilitate reconciliation. Although central to traditional reconciliation practices, 
women have historically not played an active part in their role in the practices: traditional 
reconciliation has taken place by using women as pawns to reconcile men through a practice 
of blood compensation in which, if an offense is commited, “an unmarried female in [his/her] 
family can be compelled to marry a member of the aggrieved family, to facilitate 
reconciliation between the families.”319 
 
Abductions and Sexual Slavery 
Women are not only victimised to facilitate reconciliation, as described above, but are also 
victims of revenge abductions and sexual slavery committed by both the Nuer and the Murle. 
The brutal interethnic fighting has led to an increase in abductions of women and girls as well 
as an increase in sexual violence, which has been used as a weapon between the warring 
factions. In Jonglei, women’s wombs are again being used by men. Women have become 
pawns in the interethnic conflicts, being abducted and often raped by the fighters. Further 
retaliatory raids and abductions then occur.320 In 2009, hundreds of women were abducted in 
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Jonglei state in retaliatory attacks between Lou Nuer and Murle communities, and in 2012, 
the UN reported hundreds of were abducted during raids.321 
Gender equality activist and one of the few women members of Sudan’s Legislative 
Assembly, Beatrice Aber, raising the problem of gender violence, noted that “aggrieved 
parties abduct women and children, subjecting them to sexual violence and abuse.”322 The 
killing and violence aimed at women has increased to a point where it has become “standard 
practice” 323  in the militarised inter-ethnic conflict. It has been routinely committed 
opportunistically because the conflict and the violence it engenders create conditions of 
impunity where there is no punishment for the crimes that are committed: during the raids 
women are considered to be legitimate spoils of war, along with livestock and other chattel.324 
Manuela Melandri argues the use of sexual violence as a tactic to defeat the enemy is “a 
crime perpetrated against women with a specific aim in mind: to  destroy  community  
relations  by  targeting  women  because  of  their  gender”.325 
There is no reliable data on the number of women who have been abducted during Jonglei’s 
recent conflict, often because, at the time of interviews, villagers cannot determine the fate of 
those who are designated as missing326 and often numbers of abductions reported combine 
both women and children. The UN reported that 37 people had been abducted and several 
hundred were unaccounted for following the 2011-2012 Murle-Lou Nuer raids.327 Several 
witnesses reported to the UN Human Rights Officers that they saw women and children 
abducted in the attacks. There were reports from witnesses that 66 children were abducted 
during the Lou Nuer attacks on Pibor (45 girls and 21 boys) and only four were recovered as 
of June 2012.328 A small number of women were also reported to have been returned.329 No 
arrests were made:  
“Although kidnapping/abduction is illegal and children are to be protected from 
forced marriage, in no case did government authorities arrest or initiate criminal 
proceedings against any of the abductors, whose names and whereabouts were 
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allegedly known to the SSPS [South Sudan Police Services] and/or County 
Commissioner’s office at the time that the women were turned over to authorities.” 330  
The current international discourse which embodies the UN and non-governmental 
organisation (NGO) responses to sexual violence in conflict has not problematised the social 
construction of gender which continues to fuel sexual violence in armed conflicts. 331 As 
Skjelsbæk has argued, “rape in conflict is an ‘[accentuation] of pre-existing gender relations,’ 
as opposed to a new phenomenon emerging with the eruption of hostilities”. 332  GBV 
continues within conflict because men still see sexual domination as a powerful way to 
demonstrate power over ‘the enemy’ and as a way to disconnect from ‘the other’: the 
feminised sphere of the family and the community.333 The gender discourses surrounding 
sexual violence in conflict have also tended to be “contaminated by assumptions about 
African women’s normalisation of patriarchal...violences”334 which means that often there are 
no reprisals for the sexual violence perpetrated against women during conflicts as men’s 
violence is not questioned. 
The question of what drives the abduction of women in South Sudan is a complex one to 
answer, and a number of explanations have been given for the seizure of large numbers of 
women and children during the cattle raids. These include the decline in fertility of the Murle, 
social pressure to marry and pay bride-price, and brutal cattleraiding economics in which 
women’s bodies are a form of captive wealth subject to patriarchal control in the militarised 
conflict between ethnic groups.   
One of the most frequent explanations offered by South Sudan’s President Kiir,335 politicians, 
and people on the ground in South Sudan (usually Nuer and Dinka) for the abductions is that 
many Murle women cannot procreate due to their acquisition of a sexually transmitted disease 
(reported as syphilis) that has made them sterile: 
“They allege that there are cases of [infertility] and they’re not able to bear children, 
and so for them to ensure the continuity of their community they have to abduct 
women and children.”336 
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In a 2008 radio interview, President Kiir openly acknowledged the problem of infertility as 
the cause of the abductions of women, saying: 
"If this problem is to be resolved once and for good, we need...a big hospital in Pibor, 
the town of these [Murle] people, with specialist doctors to find out exactly what sort 
of venereal diseases [they] have. And so that they are treated to bear their own 
children instead of going to look for other people's children.”337  
The Nuer youth went so far as to express their willingness to discuss the problem of infertility 
and the need for intermarriage in a statement released by the White Army in January 2012: 
“If Murle women have fertility problem, the Nuer and Dinka are willing to accept 
intermarriage with Murle. The Dinka, Nuer and Murle’s chiefs can sit down and talk 
about intermarriage to assist our Murle brothers to increase their population if their 
women are not procreating.”338  
The problem of infertility dates back several decades, according to anthropologist Jon 
Arensen, after Sudanese independence in 1955, when the Arab-run administration assigned 
militia to the Murle region, and it is alleged they introduced venereal diseases into the 
population venereal diseases that led to sterility among some of the Murle women. 339  
Arensen links the infertility to a surge in abduction of Dinka children.340 According to this 
narrative, the World Health Organisation (WHO) subsequently identified the problem and 
administered penicillin, curing the venereal disease, “and following generations of Murle 
women have had many children.”341 However, no evidence can be found to substantiate this, 
and the evidence that does exist on Murle infertility is inconclusive. A 1976-1977 study of 
Murle infertility showed that there was a high level of infertility in both the Hill Murle and 
Plain Murle, 51% (of 390 families analysed), with primary infertility accounting for 10% and 
secondary infertility—the inability to conceive after naturally conceiving at least one child—
for 41%.342 The research findings did not connect the high rate of secondary infertility to 
syphilis however. Pelvic infections in fertile and infertile women were compared, and as no 
significant difference was found it was concluded that infection could not be proved to be the 
cause of infertility.343 
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There is consequently a counter discourse to that of wide-spread infertility as the driving 
force behind Murle abductions: Arenson holds that it is “patently false”.344 Guzulu states that 
this explanation for the abductions is “completely baseless and it’s not true.”345 Guzulu argues 
that the claims of syphilis amongst the Murle are falsified for the purpose of destroying the 
image of the Murle. 346   
Guzulu,offers three primary reasons why women are abducted during the cattleraids that 
highlight how women who are seized are seen as captive wealth or tokens of exchange: 
“One: somebody, maybe he lost his wife and you go and find a beautiful wife and 
you take that woman to substitute your lost wife, to keep her as a wife. Substitute the 
dead one, that’s one.  Secondly, to take a woman who you want to produce children 
for you and then these children will get married and you get more wealth. The third 
one is, the third point, you just take these women so that your abducted cousin or 
whatever will be brought back when you give her back.” 347 
Aguti Adut, Jonglei State Director for Security and Small Arms Control, supports Guzulu’s 
first point, that “women are abducted just to be married: “If you are found, you can be 
abducted. Like now, if I found you [gestures to author] and I love you, I just abduct you. And 
you become my wife. Finished.” 348 Abductions are “very linked to cattle and marriage”349 
and the UN states that many abducted women are forced to become the ‘wives’ of men from 
the attacking community and remain there,350 in effect their captives. Abducted girls as young 
as 12 years have been sold for cattle or forced into marriage.351 
Another widely held explanation for the abductions includes competition over scarce 
resources in which women are situated as being in the middle of a process of wealth 
generation in an economy where there is deep poverty, a process which involves both 
abduction and trafficking of women and children. Firstly, the abducted woman is married “for 
free of course; [abductors] don’t have to pay…the bride-price”.352 Secondly, young girls who 
are abducted and then absorbed into the family bring bride-price to the family when they are 
of age to be married. Thirdly, women and children can be sold after being abducted for a high 
price. The price for children is said to be between 40353 and 60354 heads of cattle for a boy and 
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about 30355 heads of cattle for a girl. According to Biel Boutros Biel, Executive Director at the 
South Sudan Human Rights Society for Advocacy: 
“It has become a business. And that is why…they say they could capture the women 
and sell them, make many cows. And in Akobo I was told that one Nuer child was 
taken to Murle land and he was bought by another man [for] 60 cows! 60 heads of 
cattle. It has become a business, abducting children, especially females…now it has 
become a business…I think it is a question of trying to evaluate the productivity of 
….the kind of person you are capturing, you are taking away. Because a child, even if 
you sell, will bring a lot.”356  
This ‘business’ of abduction and subsequent human trafficking is not commonly referred to 
within South Sudan as slavery, nor has there been any literature that defines the abduction 
practices occurring currently in Jonglei as slavery, although they can be understood as such. 
Contemporary slavery is defined as “the complete control of a person, for economic 
exploitation, by violence.”357 In the 1956 Supplementary Convention to the United Nations 
1953 Slavery Convention, slavery is further defined as “the selling of women by their 
families for marriage and the buying and selling of children for labour”.358 Furthermore, in the 
context of the current conflict, abduction has not been addressed as a unique problem, but 
rather as an incidental by-product of conflict. Interviewees were reluctant to focus on the 
abductions in and of themselves, but rather preferred to discuss the drivers of the conflict such 
as revenge and retaliation, always seen to be inexorably linked to the consequence of 
abduction. 
Many of the people interviewed regarded revenge as the most significant driver of 
abductions:  “retribution has become synonymous with justice in Jonglei.”359 Raiders know 
that “nothing will pain a man as when his daughter or wife or mother are abducted, and that 
will indicate that I am so strong that I managed to take your sister!”360 Rev Daau, speaking of 
the peace conference in May 2012, “the thing that leaders were capitalizing on: the abduction 
of children and women, why?  And they were questioning the Murle people: why?  When you 
ask the Dinka and the Nuer, they would say because we were revenging.”361 He recounted the 
Lou Nuer attack on Murle in early 2012: “they were taking a revenge attack and they overran 
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the whole village and of course they were taking children and women and some were killed in 
the middle. That was a revenge [attack]”. 362 
Once abducted, the fate of the woman or girl becomes an important question for both her 
community, and for the abductor and his community. Rev John Chol Daau explained that 
quite often, a raider will abduct a woman in revenge for abductions that occurred in his own 
village, but then not know what to do with her.363  Daau argued that it is only once the woman 
or child has been abducted for revenge that his or her captor begins to contemplate what will 
be done with his captive. According to Daau, abducted women have been kept in the village 
to look after children, but not for immediate marriage. Eventually, “as in a long time later 
they will get…, ‘married’, or someone will own them, but as I mentioned before it is not the 
intention when that happens to take the women … it would take more time for them to think 
of what they should do with them.”364  
One Murle woman whom a UN Human Rights Officer interviewed described her experience 
after Lou Nuer raiders took her and her three children in 2012. The abducted – who numbered 
twice as many children as women – were forced to march in a column along the Kongkong 
River from Pibor to Akobo, a distance of over 110 km. Children who cried too much or 
complained were killed by the armed Lou Nuer youth (raiders). When they arrived in Akobo 
12 days later, the Lou Nuer began “dividing up the abducted women and children amongst 
themselves, much like they reportedly did with their massive cattle spoils.”365 Two of the 
woman’s children were taken, and she and her baby were then handed over to the South 
Sudan Police Services (SSPS) by one of the abductors. The SSPS did not file charges against 
her abductor.366 
While this particular woman interviewed by the UN was released by her captors, most 
abducted women are not so lucky. While Chair of the Human Rights Commission in Jonglei, 
Peter Guzulu worked with women who had been rescued, and he described some of their 
experiences: 
“Women, they don’t raid, they don’t abduct, they don’t kill, they don’t own guns, and 
for them to be victimised…its painful of course. Some of them are now in the hands 
of people whom they don’t want to be with them. They are terrorised. I interviewed 
some of the women who came back, and some of them were, they were confined 
maybe in a small compound like this, they don’t go out, they don’t go out to fetch 
water, they don’t go out to get firewood, in the fear that they may escape. They have 
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to pound meal and cook all day and be in one place all the time. Some of them were 
separated with their children, some of them, their children were slaughtered in front 
of them, some of them, you know, were raped, some of them were beaten. It is a 
painful experience.”367 
The UNMISS 2012 report on the Jonglei inter-communal conflict states that following 
abduction, the woman often becomes the victim of repeated incidents of rape, followed by 
forced marriage or assignment to the captors. The abducted ‘wife’ is forced to enter into 
sexual relations with her ‘husband’ for the rest of her life and to bear children. In large scale 
sexual violence during conflict, forced impregnation has been understood as the most blatant 
example of ethnic cleansing. This can be explained by cultural attitudes to ethnicity where a 
woman is seen as only a ‘biological box’, since in a patrilineal society the children will bear 
the “father-rapist’s” ethnicity.368 Through systematic rape, the perpetrators aim to increase 
members of their ethnic group, and through this to alter and erase the ethnic identities of the 
raped women.369   
Once a woman has been subjected to forced marriage and has borne children, it becomes even 
more difficult for her to leave her abductor: 
“If she manages to find an opportunity to escape, she is faced with the dilemma of 
leaving without the children, trying to leave with them or resigning herself to 
remaining with the father of the children forever.”370  
Jonglei State Representative to the Gender and Child Committee Anne Lino Wuor Abyei 
described the difficulty of abducted women t  escape: 
“I saw the women who were abducted by the Nuer taken back to Murle, and they had 
with them the children which, you know, they had while they were [in captivity]. 
Because the woman is returned with her children, even if they were born in the Murle 
land, then they go back with the children and that’s it… Now, for a woman to get up 
and to say I have been abducted and now she has children…how will she do it and 
how will she move? Maybe the woman will say, ‘okay now I don’t want to be 
separated with my children’, because if the children are big, they’ll say ‘oh no, now 
we are Murles and we don’t want to go back’, so the women will say, ‘okay because 
of my children now I have to stay’.” 371 
The practice of abductions elsewhere have been classified as ‘sexual slavery’. This term is 
helpful to differentiate the sexual violence during the conflict from the South Sudanese 
cultural practice of arranged marriage that is legal within customary law, and it could allow 
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prosecutions of the crime as ‘torture’ or ‘other inhumane acts’372 under international human 
rights law. 
Responding to Abductions 
While there are multiple treaties and international agreements which allow for international 
prosecution of crimes committed during war-time, including rape and sexual slavery, 
responsibility for prosecuting crimes committed during the Jonglei inter-ethnic conflict falls 
to the Government of South Sudan, as it is currently defined as a small outbreak of violence 
in a post-conflict society, rather than an internal conflict as defined by the Additional Protocol 
to the Geneva Convention. 373  Were the conflict to be defined as such, international 
agreements such as the Rome Statue would apply. Under the 1998 Rome Statute creating the 
International Criminal court (ICC), rape has been defined as a crime against humanity, a form 
of genocide, a form of torture or enslavement, and a crime of war. As such, rape is now 
included under jus cogens—‘higher law’ that may not be violated by any country, 374 even if 
“such acts do not violate municipal law in the state in which they were committed375—and 
can therefore be tried in the courts of any country, even those not party to the conflict.376 
Furthermore, the protection of women during conflicts has also been included under several 
international legal bodies, such as UN Resolutions 1325 on women, peace and security and 
1820 on sexual violence as a tactic of war, and the African Union Protocol on Women.377 The 
Sierra Leone Special Court significantly further expanded the definition of gender crimes 
recognised as crimes against humanity by widening their interpretation to include sexual 
slavery and forced marriages. 378 Yet, sadly, “while recent developments in jurisprudence in 
Africa have brought greater attention to the impact of conflicts on women, they have not 
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stemmed the widespread occurrences of violence against women, as this remains shockingly 
high in post-conflict settings.”379  
In the context of the current conflict in Jonglei these agreements cannot be called upon to 
elicit international legal complementarity, and the local and national judicial systems do not 
have the capacity to prosecute the current sexual crimes. In addition, women face complex 
and interlocking barriers to access to justice that include:  
“Cultural barriers (the marginalised role of women in their families and a social 
stigma attached to survivors of sexual violence); legal barriers (formal and customary 
laws, discriminatory judicial processes, and legal procedures that discriminate against 
women and afford them few legal rights); and systemic barriers (a lack of 
infrastructure, government resources, and personnel).”380 
The SSPS have not pursued investigations into alleged abductions, even when confronted 
with those involved.381 Although the South Sudanese Penal Code provides for 7-14 years 
imprisonment for kidnapping, abduction and violations of personal liberty382 and up to 14 
years imprisonment for rape and other sexual offences, 383  the weakness of the police, 
including in terms of man-power and capacity, has meant that even when directly confronted 
by someone apparently responsible for an abduction, there is no willingness to take action.384 
Furthermore, because of the perception that ‘marriage’ follows the abductions, the SPSS and 
government “rarely recognise that abductions may lead to sexual offences” 385 or GBV. A 
misunderstanding of the differences between ‘marriage’ and ‘forced marriage’ by untrained 
customary court judges (usually chiefs) can lead to forced marriage being misunderstood as 
marriage and treated as such within customary law. Marriage is upheld by customary courts 
as long as the man does not wish to get divorced, and violence (including sexual and GBV) 
that takes place within this context is “to some extent normalised in dominant social 
perceptions.”386  Customary law allows a man to ‘discipline’ his wife, and “domestic violence 
is often condoned by a court if a wife is found to be ‘behaving badly’ or not fulfilling her 
duties, such as by failing to cook for her husband, insulting him, or drinking”.387 Violence 
thrives in societies where power is entrenched in hierarchical structures and relations, and no 
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inequality is more pervasive, both vertically and horizontally, in South Sudan and across the 
globe than gender inequality.388 
Gender justice seeks to distinguish “the nefarious forms of injustice women experience during 
and after armed conflict”389 from the violence that is experienced by men. To date, integrating 
gender justice into accountability mechanisms across the world has resulted in increasing 
women’s representation at the decision-making table and addressing the problem of impunity 
for sexual violence.  
“Gender-related concerns  are  frequently  overlooked  during  the  devising  and  
implementation  of  [truth-telling] mechanisms,  leading  to  a lack of justice for GBV 
and a failure to examine how gender inequalities underpin much of the violence 
taking place”.390  
Given the social stigma in South Sudan associated with abduction, rape, sexual slavery, and 
other forms of GBV, a more nuanced from of accountability may be required. GBV is 
inherently difficult to investigate; the crimes are intensely personal, the injuries often less 
visible, and the details provoke discomfort and aversion. 391 Commenting on the response to 
GBV, Clement Ochan has noted the low number of reports of rape in South Sudan: 
“Most victims [in South Sudan] do not report their rape, due to high stigma against 
rape victims and the shame that it may bring to the family. Families may not be 
willing to report for fear of reducing the bride-price if it is known that a young 
woman has been ‘spoiled’”.392 
There is reluctance from all sides and the tendency is to ignore GBV, but the alternative is 
silence, impunity, and grave injustice.393 According to Helen Scanlon and Kelli Muddell, 
truth-telling mechanisms offer women opportunities to participate in and influence the peace-
building process and they also “present a medium to document patterns of GBV… [and] to 
create a more accurate historical record of the conflict”. 394  Truth-telling mechanisms, if 
inclusive, can also provide an opportunity for women’s voices to be heard, that is not 
alienating and exploitative.395 
As noted, often abductions, forced marriage/sexual slavery, and other sexual violence are not 
addressed directly because they are seen merely as a by-product of the inter-ethnic conflict. 
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When asked why abductions received little to no mention in the discussions amongst 
participants at the conference, Peter Guzulu explains: 
“People know that abductions happen because of a fight, so when we address the 
issue of fighting, or of the war among the [ethnic groups], then abduction will not 
happen. That’s why we have to concentrate on the main agenda, which is raiding and 
attacks against each other. And so when they address this, and nobody is attacking the 
other side, then abductions will not take place. That is why they want to address the 
stem of the conflict.”396 
However, as has been illustrated above, abductions are not just a by-product of the conflict, 
but are a product of the existing patriarchal hierarchy which results in unequal gender power 
relations and cultural practices. Abductions have not been adequately addressed as a result of 
the deep-seated gender imbalances in a historically patriarchal culture. A focus on restorative 
gender justice and reconciliation could help both men and women move beyond their trauma 




                                                     
396 Guzulu, interview with author, Juba, September 7, 2012. 
397 Noleen Heyzer, “Gender Justice”, Statement to the Security Council on Women, Peace and Security by Noleen Heyzer, 












Chapter 5 | Reconciliation in Jonglei 
 
“We, the People of South Sudan... Dedicated to a genuine national healing process and the 
building of trust and confidence in our society through dialogue...Determined to lay the 
foundation for a united, peaceful and prosperous society based on justice, equality, respect for 
human rights and the rule of law… Do hereby adopt and promulgate this Interim Constitution 
of Southern Sudan.” 398 
 
Reconciliation and Gender Justice 
Reconciliation is the process of repairing damaged relationships.399  In order for people to 
come to terms with a traumatic past, a process of acknowledgement, forgiveness, 
reconciliation and healing is required as stepping stones towards the building of a viable, 
legitimate and inclusive democracy. 400   Only with acknowledgement of what has gone 
before—at the national, community and individual level—can relationships begin to be 
restored.  Although the word reconciliation has many meanings and remains a highly-
contested concept, the basic definition entails the intersection of a search for a shared truth, 
some form of justice, and an element of forgiveness and healing.401 During the reconciliation 
process, the parties should feel that the truth about the past is being revealed, recognised, and 
remembered; that justice is being fulfilled or re-established and injustices are being corrected; 
that their vulnerability is decreasing; and that healing is taking place through “the 
acknowledgment of victimization, the restoration of dignity and the management of 
trauma.”402 According to Donald Shriver, “no ‘new integration’ will ever be possible between 
enemies in a struggle over social justice without their mutual achievement of a new memory 
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of the past, a new justice in the present, and a new hope for community in the still-to-be-
achieved future.”403  
In a post-conflict society like South Sudan, deeper forms of social reconciliation and 
transformation are needed to redress the traumatic events that transpired during the conflict.404 
Post-conflict reconciliation can typically occur in a situation where war has ended, a 
settlement has been reached, and a new regime is faced with the challenge of reconstructing 
society and restoring damaged relationships. In this context, reconciliation is a process 
through which a society moves from a divided past to a shared future and re-builds 
relationships between former enemies. Of particular  concern  here  are  the  issues  raised  
when  a  gender  perspective  is  included  in reconciliation efforts, particularly as to how this 
could affect the idea of who needs to be reconciled. It is important to understand women’s 
roles in these conflicts and to acknowledge that men and women experience war differently 
and hence have different post-conflict needs. To date, reconciliation discourses have 
substantially failed to address gender reconciliation.405 
In South Sudan, traditional reconciliation has taken place by using women as pawns to 
reconcile men.406 There has not been a focus on restorative gender justice and reconciliation. 
Gender reconciliation is the convergence of men and women to understand and empathize 
with each other and to work together to end gender injustice, including discrimination and 
GBV. This is achieved both through gender justice: that is, the ending of, and the provision of 
redress for, inequalities between women and men that result in women's subordination to 
men; and by mainstreaming gender by incorporating strategies to ensure focus on gender and 
women’s issues, as well as the engagement of more women personnel in all dimensions of 
design, implementation, monitoring and evaluations of policies and programs.407 The concept 
of restorative gender justice moves beyond discourses of criminal punishment to focus on 
repairing relationships.  
South Sudan’s 2012 Country Gender Assessment (CGA) highlighted the need for inclusivity 
of reconciliation policies, recommending that the GRSS should “ensure a credible and gender 
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inclusive process of accountability and national reconciliation to promote healing, unity, and 
peaceful co-existence.” 408 However, it has been argued that this recommendation was too 
general to be of any concrete assistance. 409  Advocacy against GBV is not effective if 
relegated to women’s groups but when men also play a role in promoting the public 
acknowledgement of this violence—an act which is traditionally discouraged for women.  
In South Sudan, poverty and disarmament as well as the absence of proper reintegration 
programmes and trauma counselling after the civil war have added to heightened 
emasculation of men and break-down in communities’ social and cultural cohesion. Targeted 
sexual violence within the inter-ethnic conflict in Jonglei has further affected gender relations 
as well as men’s self-worth and masculinities. Acknowledgement is the first step towards 
repairing and healing the engendered trauma. 
 
Seeking the Truth 
In an attempt to theorize the relation of violence to acknowledgment and justice, René Girard 
describes the historical move from sacrifice to judicial systems, in which the private 
vengeance of a sacrifice (which must then be avenged) is replaced by the public vengeance of 
a trial, which punishes the actual perpetrator, and not a surrogate. 410 John Borneman critiques 
this theory, arguing that sacrifice is not an event which occurs only in primitive societies but 
in modern ones as well, and the sacrificial group is not in fact an undifferentiated whole, but 
rather a politically selected “reservoir for pollution and therefore a target for purification”.411 
His understanding is that sacrifice is intended to identify and kill, symbolically or actually, in 
order to purify and unite the affected group. The Dinka were one of the main societies cited 
by Borneman to support this theory, and therefore his argument that “modern judicial systems 
in democratic states are not immune from sacrificial rites, but instead, especially during this 
period of (re)invocation, they rely on sacrifices in order to…assuage victims” 412  is 
particularly applicable to the case of Jonglei. 
The most familiar form of justice is criminal prosecution. Criminal trials serve two principal 
purposes: first, they constitute an acknowledgment of the suffering inflicted on the victims, 
and second, they serve to reinforce society by demonstrating that “the most fundamental rules 
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that make a civilized society possible may not be flouted with impunity.413 According to 
Aryeh Neier, “justice provides closure. Its absence not only leaves wounds open, but its very 
denial rubs salt in them”.414 Accordingly, governments have a duty to achieve justice for 
victims of human rights abuses through accountability of the offenders. Morally, victims, 
their loved ones, and the community have a right to know the details regarding the 
perpetrators, victims, and circumstances of human rights violations.415 Since the police and 
judiciary in Jonglei have demonstrated that they do not have the capacity to prosecute raiders 
and abductors, a peace conference that incorporates a strong element of truth-telling or an 
investigatory commission may be better suited to the needs of the current conflict. Naming 
names is part of the truth-telling process, and is especially important when the judicial system 
does not function well enough to expect trials. Those named in a truth-telling exercise or a 
commission of inquiry report are popularly understood to be guilty, and the distinction 
between criminal and legal guilt lost on most readers.416 “The exact form of accountability is 
less important than the existence of some process for stigmatizing the offender”.417  
“The revelation of the truth…and the resulting public condemnation serve just as well as the 
imposition of punishment to impress upon the public minds the kind of behaviour society is 
unwilling to accept”.418 Truth-telling brings the effect of the truth process from the confined 
perpetrator/victim spheres to the wider affected community, allowing all members to feel the 
effect of the process. Truth-telling processes are important methods to redress violence and 
serve to help—at a collective level—to establish a ‘historical memory’ of violence 
committed, and—at an individual level—to help victims feel validated by the affirmation of 
others that gross violence was committed against them and therefore to begin to feel peace 
and to heal. Louis Bickford fu thers this argument, explaining that truth-telling is a key 
element of historical accountability, limiting the possibility of denial or the trivialization of 
victims’ experiences and “transforming common ‘knowledge’ into official 
‘acknowledgment’”. 419  By providing a platform for victims’ experiences to come alive, 
people begin to understand the context of violations, and see that the victims who spoke about 
violations were not speaking just for themselves, but were representing many who were 
unable to come forward. This will help peacebuilding in a volatile region, as peaceful 
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coexistence is much more likely if those who were victimized see someone called to account 
for their suffering.420  
However, there is also a risk that a truth-telling process can open up painful wounds and serve 
as a catalyst for more conflict. Leben Nelson Moro discussed the risk in Jonglei that truth-
telling, if it went back to the time of the 1991 SPLM split and the subsequent Bor Massacre, 
could re-open a lot of wounds: “people [may] say ‘we can never forgive this’”.421 Moro 
advised, “maybe, don't open [wounds] up. Maybe it is still too early to open them up. Give it 
time a bit for things to cool down. And that is the main concern of many people is that, so 
many bad things happened, so many atrocities were committed by all sorts of people, so 
better just lie low. Time alone is another way to [heal]”.422   
 
The Wunlit and Liliir Peace Conferences, 1999 and 2000 
Ten years prior to the recent escalation of violence a surge in violence in then Upper Nile, 
Bor County, Sudan, led to truth-telling and reconciliation processes that have been heralded 
in the new South Sudan as positive examples of inclusive peacebuilding. In 1999 and 2000, 
two inter-communal peace conferences were held in what is now Jonglei: the Dinka Nuer 
West Bank Peace & Reconciliation Conference (in Wunlit, March 1999), and the East Bank 
Nilotic People Peace and Reconciliation Conference (in Liliir, May 2000). The conferences 
are commonly referred to by the locations they were held, and thus will be called ‘the Wunlit 
Conference’ and ‘the Liliir Conference’ henceforth.  
The Dinka-Nuer West Bank Peace & Reconciliation Conference held in Wunlit, March 1999, 
was a turning point for women in [South] Sudan; they were given a platform to speak and 
were able to participate as session leaders. Female Chairperson Ayen Maguot spoke out in the 
conference: “you, women, please continue to sing. I say to you men, you must stop ridiculing 
women. Today we have the victory, for I am your chairman. Even if we are silent the children 
learn from their parents. In the past we have not spoken because you have deprived us. We 
women are honest in what we say.”423 
At the conference, Sarah Nyanyuot Chol implored all participants, and especially the youth, 
to pay attention to women’s input at the conference: 
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“It has long been true that women are ignored, like a dog that passes by, no one pays 
attention to it…All of you, but especially the youth, be patient and listen to what the 
women have to say. It is good that we women are here to witness the outcome of 
these meetings...I want to grasp hands [with a Dinka woman] so that our young 
people can see that we are reconciled. Any resolutions that come from this meeting 
should also include the contribution of we women. Throughout the recent years of 
war we have been unhappy with our soldiers…In this meeting it is not you who will 
make decisions alone, but we women must also participate…We women have come 
here for peace and reconciliation. If women were not participating, we would have 
doubted its authenticity…I invite all women to participate fully in this conference. I 
asked my sister to stand beside me because I want to show those who make problems 
among us, that we [Nuer and Dinka] stand together for peace and reconciliation. We 
women, we will grasp our hands together.” 424 
Mother Sadia Mangok explained the effect of the conflict on women and the dangers they 
faced in travelling to Wunlit to attend the conference: 
“I have come with women from Dinka, and women of Nuer.  This is a place of 
destruction and suffering, of war, where many have been killed before our 
peoples.  Yet they have come to be with us in this place, knowing that they could 
suffer with us and even be killed.  Yet they are willing to die.  Someone who has 
come to be with you in such difficult conditions is greater than a mother or a 
sister.  Their solidarity is a great gift.”425 
She then described the crucial role that she and other women had come to Wunlit to play in 
the peacebuilding and reconciliation process: 
“What we women want to ask of you, (chanting begins among people) is why should 
our children suffer and die as they are?  In any conflict, men do not reconcile with 
one another, but it is the women who feel the pain and call for reconciliation between 
our peoples.  I have three years running the Workshop in Adoor.  When we began the 
peace process we were given the mandates written down.  People mocked us and 
laughed saying you will be killed by the enemy.  But today we are succeeding, and 
you men must follow us as we open the way for peace. Today we are in Wunlit for 
the purpose of peace and reconciliation.  What I pray to God is for the peace of our 
peoples.  Yesterday we sacrificed Mabior [a bull] to confirm this, our intention, 
which we have all witnessed.  Mabior has washed the evil and conflict from among 
us, and I want us to continue in this way.  We women call for peace and call all men 
to follow us.”426 
Another significant achievement of the Wunlit conference was the way in which abductions 
were treated. Addressing the abductions of women and children was a primary focus, and a 
working-group of 60 participants produced and presented targeted recommendations for the 
creation of abductee identification teams and the return of women and girls who had been 
abducted and “married”. Although the “forced marriage” was treated as “marriage” by the 
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participants and not as a gender-based crime to be prosecuted, the emphasis on the women’s 
voice throughout the proposed process was a step forward for gender justice. The resolutions 
included asking an unmarried abducted woman whether or not she desired to remain with her 
“husband,” requiring payment of bride-price if yes; and repatriating a previously married 
woman and her children to her home community immediately, requiring the abductor to pay a 
fine for adultery. The recommendations conclude with the statement, “the taking of women 
must be strongly discouraged. The practice corrupts and destroys our family structure”.427 
Following the presentation of the resolutions, a discussion followed between Stephen With 
and moderator Dhol Acuil which highlights the way abductions are often understood. Mr. 
With requested that the provision that required an abductor to pay a fine for adultery to the 
woman’s husband be removed, as the women had remained with their new “husbands” for a 
long time. The moderator replied that  “it is a violation when a married woman is taken as a 
wife in a foreign land in both Dinka and Nuer customary law. The other point Stephen says 
that it would be wrong to fine the man for adultery. When you have taken a woman who is 
another man's wife, and then declare you have no responsibility to pay a fine, that is an 
offence in any court on earth.” 428  In response to this, another man argued that unless 
abductors were also required to return captured cattle and bring back to life the people they 
had killed, then they should not be made to pay a fine for adultery, saying “it is true that the 
woman concerned has been abducted. But the woman has been found alive, and she can 
return to her husband. What's wrong with that? The husband is fortunate. The one who must 
pay compensation for adultery is one who has seduced someone's wife. He is a thief and must 
be punished.” This viewpoint sparked a debate amongst the participants and the leadership as 
to whether or not a woman was a legitimate “booty of war”.429 At no point was any mention 
made of prosecutions for abduction or for the women’s rights, but rather the conversation 
revolved around the rights of the husband and the abductor, who had “care[d] for her, feeding 
her for a long time.”430 This conversation illuminates the opinions surrounding abductions in 
Jonglei and demonstrates the way abductions, sexual slavery, and women’s rights are often 
conceptualised. After discussing abductions, the conference participants proposed resolutions 
to encourage reconciliation amongst the political elite, inculding that a letter be sent to Dr. 
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John Garang and Riek Machar requesting that they come together to reconcile their 
differences. 
Inspired by the success of the Wunlit Conference, the Liliir Conference431 brought together 
over 250 traditional and civil leaders from Anyuak, Dinka, Jie, Kachipo, Murle and Duer 
ethnic groups, to “address the deep division and conflict that have arisen between them, 
especially as a result of the country's 17 year long civil war” and “aggravated (and in many 
cases manipulated) by the warring parties”. 432 As a result of the conference, attendees agreed 
on access to animal grazing areas and water points, to amnesty for prior offences, and to the 
return of all abducted women and children; these agreements were written as a public 
covenant between the ethnic groups for peace and reconciliation and signed by all 129 
representatives.433 Regarding abductions, the Liliir recommendations were severely lacking 
compared to the recommendations from Wunlit and simply stated that "all abducted women 
and children are freely returned to their places of origin, and where necessary, marriage 
customs are fulfilled.”434 
 
The Jonglei Peace Conference, 2012 
Over a decade after the Wunlit and Liliir conferences, following the recent surge in violence 
in Jonglei, in February 2012 President Kiir appointed a Presidential Committee for Peace, 
Reconciliation and Tolerance in Jonglei State, chaired by Archbishop Daniel Deng Bul, and 
in May 2012, an All Jonglei Peace Conference was held in Bor. Anne Lino Wuor Abyei, who 
was selected by President Kiir to serve as a session leader at the conference, explained “the 
objective is to see the root causes and to see how the government can bring a lasting peace, 
and how the community can be involved, how the leaders, the chiefs, the women, the youth, 
and even the students and the civil society, we include the church also, yes. So the objective 
of it is to know the root causes and the lasting peace in Jonglei state.”435 However Lam 
Cosmas, co-facilitator of the Greater Fangok regional peace conference, described the peace 
process in Jonglei as “an effort of…not peacebuilding…but it is fire fighting.”436 
Rev. John Chol Daau, the Co-facilitator of the conference for the South Sudan Council of 
Churches who headed the selection committee, made provisions for the inclusion of all ethnic 
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groups, as well as equal representation by religious leaders, traditional leaders, youth from 
cattle-camps, and especially women.437  According to Rev. Daau, 
“The communities felt that the women should say their concern, that they should 
express their grievances or whatever concern they had, and I would personally say the 
conference is well represented by the women. I was part of the organizing team to 
recruit participants; we were very intentional that women and the youth have to be 
represented properly, although I’m not yet convinced whether [the women] were able 
to talk as I would have wished, but they considerably have talked and expressed their 
views, and that shows to me that the communities have realized the most effective 
people are the children and women.”438 
The selection committee worked to ensure that women were represented, and although none 
of the county commissioners or chiefs were women, thirteen women representatives (of 89 
delegates) attended to fulfil a quota for “women representatives”,439 and one session leader, 
Honourable Anne Lino Wuor Abyei, was a woman. None of the county commissioners were 
women, and session leader Honourable Anne Lino Wuor Abyei noted on the record that there 
had been no female chief nominated to attend the conference.440 After the conference, she 
shared that women “talked beautifully and very courageously. I saw them there speaking.” 
She argued that, for those women who felt uncomfortable speaking out in front of men, a 
women-only conference would have allowed them to feel safe and to air their grievances 
more substantially and participate more actively in the discussion: “it would be more, it 
would be better in a more, only women conferences. But for educated women, yes, they 
always speak up.”441 
Lam Cosmas was not as positive as Ab ei about the role that the women were able to play, 
and argued that their voices were not respected and men did not heed their words as they did 
the male speakers’: 
“It is just window dressing that the women were there, it is just window dressing, it is 
just window dressing, let’s take it, it is just window dressing so that we show that the 
women are there.  We need to see that they come and make speeches… really, the 
women in the Peace Conference were just nominal. Nominal. Nominal…And because 
they are down, they are down, they are down, they are down there. So when we 
develop the criteria and say, each county should bring at least two women, of course 
the quality matters. And when you bring illiterate, illiteracy affects the leadership.”442 
The peace conference was also criticized for being too far removed from the actual conflict. 
According to Leben Nelson Moro:  
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“You create this artificial environment; you pull [people] out of the wild and then you 
sit here in this hotel, a very strange environment, and people talk and they agree on 
something, people clap, and then people go back to the real world…It is a lot of this 
one off with the media people showing up,  they go around and they greet [each 
other], they sometimes do, like, the cultural funny funny what, and then they go 
home. Everybody says, ‘we have solved the problem.’” 443 
Due in part to the resurgence of David Yau Yau’s militia, the All-Jonglei process was not 
been able to put an end to the violence. However, it is important to recognise that progress 
was made towards truth-telling, open dialogue, and reconciliation. In addition, important 
steps were taken towards greater inclusivity, especially for women. Both the 1999 Wunlit and 
the 2012 All-Jonglei inter-communal peace conferences have been referenced as positive 
examples of the shifting in perceptions of the roles of women as leaders and peacebuilders. 
Furthermore, at the All-Jonglei Conference, all six of Jonglei’s ethnic groups signed a peace 
deal witnessed by President Salva Kiir Mayardit on May 6, 2012 in Bor, and a short period of 
increased security followed. 
A new National Committee for Healing, Peace and Reconciliation (NCHPR), chaired by 
Archbishop Daniel Deng Bul, was formed in May 2013, to continue the work of 
reconciliation not just in Jonglei, but in all of South Sudan. The Committee took over where 
the former Journey of Healing and Reconciliation—led by former Vice President Riek 
Machar and his wife Angelina Teny, and supported by Initiatives of Change—left off. In a 
political move in April, a precursor to the government reshuffle which removed Machar from 
the Vice Presidency, President Kiir issued a presidential order halting the Machar-driven 
reconciliation process, and forming a new committee. The new church-led national process 
began with a day of prayer on 8 July 2013—the eve of the anniversary of Independence. As 
Deputy Chair of the Committee for National Healing, Peace and Reconciliation, Bishop 
Taban emphasised that the process “must be built on spirituality and also on our rich 
traditional culture.”444 
The Committee will begin the community-led process of National Healing, Peace and 
Reconciliation by travelling to all 10 states later this year and into 2014 to conduct extensive 
community consultations. Guided by the core values of pluralism, inclusivity, peacemaking, 
social justice, forgiveness, healing, atonement and sovereignty; the Committee will endeavor 
to establish and strengthen an independent and inclusive platform and mechanism to 
collectively address the root causes of conflicts in South Sudan; build bridges across the 
political and social divides; heal and reconcile all South Sudanese, particularly those with the 
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most severe physical and psychological scars; resolve all war-induced community conflicts; 
and document and establish community narratives of the war and the respective healing and 
reconciliation journeys.445 
After the longest civil war on the African continent, “we are all traumatised,” says Bishop 
Taban, “we have to heal ourselves. It is a big thing, but for me I say, because I have faith, I 
am always optimistic. With God, there is nothing impossible.” 446 
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Chapter 6 | Peacebuilding,  Politics and Reconciliation 
 
Engendering Peacebuilding  
Peacebuilding was defined by Boutros Boutros-Ghali as “sustained, co-operative work to deal 
with underlying economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems” and refers to activities 
that seek “to establish the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those 
foundations” in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.447 Peacebuilding is a process where 
political, security, and development aspects come together, and incorporates initiatives such 
as disarming, reintegrating ex-combatants, advancing the protection of human rights, 
promoting formal and informal political partnership, and promoting conflict resolution and 
reconciliation techniques. 448  
The UN has made steps forward in promoting a gendered perspective within peace-making 
and peacebuilding through the October 2000 adoption of UNSCR 1325, which affirms: “the 
important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peace-building, 
and … [stresses] the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts 
for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security,” and mandates that states “ensure 
increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and 
international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of 
conflict.”449  
In Resolution 1325, the Security Council highlighted the strong link between women’s 
inclusion and the promotion and maintenance of sustained peace, and appealed for “effective 
institutional arrangements to guarantee their protection and full participation in the peace 
process.”450  The resolution calls for ‘gender balance’ in participation throughout all processes 
for decision making, policy making and operationalizing measures for post-conflict peace-
building and ‘gender mainstreaming’ in the formulation of all peace-building policies, 
practices and law and in their implementation. In many countries, including South Sudan, 
endemic discrimination is still a significant barrier to achieving the resolution’s goal of 
inclusivity and gender equality.451 Although UNSCR 1325 gives women’s organizations a 
meaningful tool to legitimize their demands for inclusion, unfortunately, “the nature of 
conflict often results in the exclusion of women’s voices from peace negotiations resulting in 
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their concerns not being addressed in any meaningful way in the peacebuilding process”.452 
Lack of political will for the implementation of the principles enshrined in UNSCR 1325 in 
South Sudan, as well as culturally entrenched gender discrimination, has the potential to 
render the resolution meaningless. Christine Chinkin and Hillary Charlsworth have reasoned 
that the resolution’s sweeping definitions deprive the concepts contained within of any force 
and, when translated into action, governments often employ ‘gender mainstreaming’ through 
general provisions to take account of ‘the needs of women as victims of conflict, which frame 
women as victims rather than actors in peacebuilding with transformative potential”. 453 
Classifying women solely as victims of conflict reinforces their subordination by men, who 
do not view them as equal players in negotiation and peacebuilding exercises, but rather as 
passive pawns, used by men during conflict, who need to be protected by men in the 
aftermath. According to Eve Ayiera: 
“The UN dialogue on sexual violence has highlighted the importance of inclusion of 
women in peace talks, in decision making processes. However, this approach does 
not problematize the fact that the system into which women are to be included is 
already dysfunctional as a tool for equality in social relations. Further, the use of 
phrases such as ‘taking women’s views into account’ indicates an acceptance of 
women on the periphery mitigated by generous calls for opportunities to participate, 
not as equals where they can question the system, but to have their views included 
much as one would take into account the opinions of an external party. The discourse, 
while seeking to shift the balance of power, in fact reiterates that women are on the 
outside looking in, and are asking for a seat at the table ‘if it is alright with the 
boys’.”454  
Despite UNHCR 1325’s weaknesses, it nevertheless offers women a language recognised by 
states in which to claim an entitlement to be involved in policy and decision making about 
peacebuilding.455 In South Sudan, civil society organizations and women’s groups invoked 
UNSCR 1325 in their demands to have women be included at the negotiation table during the 
peace negotiations at both Machakos in 2002 and Naivasha in 2005. In response, SPLA/M 
nominated women to attend the Machakos negotiations in 2002, but former SPLA/M 
negotiator Anne Itto’s insight as one of the delegates was that, although invited, the women 
were not able to participate in the negotiations in any meaningful way. “The women were 
often co-opted…at short notice…with very little opportunity to develop a women’s peace 
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agenda; they were expected to contribute to the overall party position, which was gender 
blind to begin with.”456  
During the Machakos negotiations, when SPLA/M female representatives proposed a 
minimum quota of 25% women at all levels of government, “one senior member of the 
SPLA/M delegation laughed and asked [Itto] where the women would be found to fill these 
positions”.457 While this quota was initially accepted in the larger group, which included three 
women, it was dropped to 5% by the all-male SPLA/M drafting committee. Although the 
Chairman subsequently raised the quota to 10%, it was eventually refused by government 
negotiators on the basis that women had not been fighters.458  
According to ElSawi of women’s advocacy group SuWEP, despite strong efforts to send ten 
SuWEP representatives to the negotiations, as was their right under UNSCR 1325, women 
were denied participation on the basis that “this was a men’s affair”.459 As a result, there were 
no women present at the Naivasha negotiations in 2005, which resulted in the CPA. Anne Itto 
emphasizes that this was not due to lack of experience or capacity, but purely perceptions of 
women’s role “as passive victims of war, not active players in politics and security”.460 While 
women’s position papers were accepted at Naivasha, their concerns were not included among 
the recommendations.461 Even though female combatants comprised 7% of the SPLA fighting 
force, women were not able to gain access to the post-referendum negotiations due to the fact 
they were not recognized as fighters in the 2005 CPA. As such, they were denied a voice “in 
vital decisions concerning the political, economic, legal, and military future of the 
country”.462 Female SPLA fighters interviewed by Dyan Mazurana emphasized that women’s 
issues had been marginalized during the peace negotiations, and that women were absent or 
silenced during the discussions.463 
As discussed earlier, the CPA called for a ceasefire, a withdrawal of troops from Southern 
Sudan, wealth-sharing and power-sharing, and a referendum for the independence of 
Southern Sudan to be held no later than January, 2011.464 It also included provisions for a 
Southern Sudanese Interim Constitution, which included a Bill of Rights, but did not address 
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structural injustices, such as reliance on customary law, in an inclusive manner.465 Since 
women were absent during the negotiations the final CPA was largely gender-blind. USAID’s 
Don Steinberg argues that a peace agreement which is ‘gender neutral’/gender-blind is, by 
definition, discriminatory against women.  
Although members of civil society and women’s groups maintained that gender 
mainstreaming in both the implementation and monitoring mechanisms of the CPA were vital 
to ensure women’s needs be met during the formative peacebuilding process, the CPA 
provided no guarantee for women’s participation in its implementation466 and lacked any clear 
gender targets and timelines, “limiting the effective utilization of women’s experiences, 
expertise and perspectives in decision-making in the post conflict period”.467 The CPA also 
did not include any provision for monitoring progress on women’s inclusion. The UN’s Joint 
Assessment Mission (JAM) for the CPA did however make gender mainstreaming a priority 
in reconstruction. JAM worked with UNIFEM to conduct extensive consultations with 
Sudanese women to help create a gender sensitive framework for sustainable peace.468 
Away from the stage of large-scale negotiations, there are many bold and courageous women 
who have quietly worked for peace and reconciliation at the grassroots level in their 
communities. In 1995, such efforts of one women’s association leader, Elizabeth Nyawana 
Lam, gained public and political attention when she helped to quell violence between Bul and 
Leek Nuer in Western Upper Nile. Elizabeth Nyawana Lam, who had already gained a 
reputation for her “extraordinary courage” 469  by fighting with SPLA at the beginning of the 
war, ordered all Bul and Leek Nuer WAAF to return home immediately; without the 
protection of women to care for the wounded, the men withdrew. She again played a 
significant leadership role in a 1996 debate which radiated throughout local military units and 
the wider civilian population: Rebecca Nyanciew, head of the Bul Nuer women’s union, 
supported an ‘eye for an eye’ in the killing of women and children in raids, while Elizabeth 
vehemently objected. 470  Elizabeth Nyawana Lam’s position was eventually supported, and 
the Nuer men agreed that they would not kill Murle and Dinka women and children.  
Community women’s groups and the South Sudan Women’s Association continue to work  
promoting women’s role in peacebuilding and in reconciliation processes, despite limited 
access to resources. To help empower grassroots activists to affect policy change, Akinyi 
                                                     
465 Bennet et al., op. cit., 2010. 
466 International Crisis Group, op. cit., June 2006. 
467 Itto, op. cit., 2006. 
468 Itto, op. cit., 2006. 













Walender facilitates a Caritas program “linking the grassroots women to the woman in 
leadership because that has been a very big problem. The [grassroots] women complain that 
while they’re very instrumental in helping their fellow women to come into positions of 
responsibility, once the women get there they literally forget them.  They say they don’t even 
know how to talk to them.”471 
 
Engendering Politics  
 
“We would like to be like women in other parts of the world who share in decision 
making...If we do not take a prominent role then our hopes will not be fulfilled.” 472 
Rural women are often not able to access political structures themselves because of language 
and literacy barriers. “When you speak to south Sudanese woman and especially those out in 
the villages they express themselves in their own language but if you get that translated they 
make a lot of sense; they know exactly what they would like to say.  But as many of them will 
often tell you their biggest problem is lack of education.  They cannot read or write."473 
Although there is no education requirement for eligibility for membership in the National 
Legislature, there is a requirement that the candidate “be literate”.474 Along with literacy 
constraints, women’s participation in politics is further restricted, severely, by entrenched 
patriarchal social structures. 475  “Women discussing politics in public are automatically 
referred to as prostitutes”, says Upper Nile Minister of Social Development Sarah Nyanath 
Elijah, and politics is viewed as “a dirty game women should be too refined to play”.476  
Since the signing of the CPA in 2005, South Sudan has committed itself to ensuring women’s 
participation, including through a quota system, although women’s effective participation in 
decision making positions is still very low.477  
The SPLA/M does not have a strong history of women in leadership—whether as fighters, 
negotiators, or members of the leadership council. Even President Kiir has noted that 
although women’s “role has been as effective as men in the field…our women have had 
minimal representation in the decision making of the SPLA as compared to men”.478 In 2005 
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only 10% of the SPLA/M Leadership Council were women. 479 Encouragingly, Anne Itto 
reports that President Kiir refuses to view any list of appointees for state and GRSS positions 
that do not include women, and he has appointed women as chairpersons for the Human 
Rights Commission and the Anti-Corruption Commission, as well as two cabinet ministers, 
four Chairpersons of Parliamentary Committees and two presidential advisors. Despite the 
quota and promises of inclusion, however, government commitments to women’s 
participation at the national levels have not been met.480 In the first election in the South, held 
in April 2010, the South Sudanese Legislative Assembly reserved 42 out of 159 seats 
obtained by the SPLM as “Women’s List” seats,481 but although this resulted in 19% women 
in the Legislative Assembly,482 only 9% were ministers,483 and only one of the ten states was 
governed by a woman.484 Quotas only go so far; attitudes, perceptions and actions taken by 
individuals and communities determine how women are defined in politics and how 
successful they can be. 
Since South Sudanese women face enormous discrimination in legal, cultural, and traditional 
practices, Akinyi Walender reasons, “it’s one thing to have affirmative action, it’s quite 
another to in fact, to affect and enable those women to be effective.”485 Even if elected, Asha 
Arabi explains that many women lack the experience that could “enable them to quickly get 
to grips with how the systems work and what is required of them to effectively carry out their 
mandates.”486  However, while both men and women in South Sudan have faced significant 
barriers to formal education, women’s skills are more often questioned, and lack of education 
is often cited as a reasonable restriction to fulfilling the quota.487  
Furthermore, often men place women strategically in political positions and then control their 
engagement with decision making. “Those women who are in the offices…when it comes to 
getting their salary, there's a man coming to collect her salary, it is not her. So the man says, 
‘I will put you in this job, so you cannot talk.’”488 Women in politics who are not having their 
husbands pull their strings are still often wary of speaking up for fear of losing their jobs: 
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“If you speak up as a woman now, speaking about women, men are the majority at 
the jobs, they are the ones who get these women jobs. You are seen to be very vocal, 
criticizing men, with no constitutional rights you can be removed, simply. And then 
go home and cook for your children. Then you will even lose...You will not speak 
any more. Yeah there are difficulties. You cannot blame women that they do not 
speak up. If you speak up, you can be removed.”489 
Gender issues are perceived as largely alien and irrelevant by male SPLA/M members. In a 
recent UNMISS gender sensitivity training exercise, SPLA commanders expressed surprise 
that women could hold equal positions in employment and education and could enjoy equal 
opportunities. 490  Another training conducted by ICTJ in Juba highlighted how alien the 
concept of gender inclusion is within South Sudanese society; participants initially responded 
that “gender was a Western concept and that concern for it meant promoting the domination 
of women over men”.491 
To help combat this perception, the GRSS created the Ministry of Gender, Child and Social 
Welfare (MoGCSW) at the birth of the nation in July 2011. . The Ministry is mandated to 
spearhead and support gender mainstreaming across government policies, programs and 
budgets, but has lacked human, technical and financial resources for this task. “In 2011 the 
proposed budget allocation to the Ministry as per the Minister of Finance 2011 January 
Budget speech, [was] 8.7m SDP (1.9 million USD). This continues to be one of the smallest 
ministerial budgets in Government of South Sudan.”492 
According to the Gender Support and Development Project completion report released by the 
Ministry in 2012, although the Ministry’s Country Gender Assessment (CGA) did not achieve 
its primary objective of providing a focused strategy for the government of South Sudan to 
create a comprehensive policy for gender mainstreaming, it nevertheless, “is a successful first 
step,”493 and the Ministry has just finalised a comprehensive (draft) NGP that was under legal 
review in early 2013. Unfortunately, traditional beliefs, gender bias, and lack of resources 
continue to negatively affect the success of the Ministry of Gender’s mandate, 494  and 
recommendations in the NGP may be slow to be actualised. 
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Leben Nelson Moro reasons, “it is a good thing to see many women in the offices, but it is not 
a huge change for women...For the ordinary women it will take time, it will take education; I 
think [education] is very crucial.”495 Peter Guzulu agrees,  
“It will take time. First of all, we need to have a lot of women who are educated. 
That’s one. It’s not only women. Also at least half of the population in this country 
must get a good education for them to see that it is wrong naturally and it is wrong 
constitutionally. Women are human beings and they are part of our society. If you 
mistreat them, where do you think they will go and what part of the community are 
they? It is a natural thing.”496 
 
Engendering Reconciliation 
Women have been marginalised from peacebuilding and from politics, and abductions and 
sexual violence that have taken place in Jonglei have not been adequately addressed as a 
result of the deep-seated gender imbalances in a historically patriarchal culture. The exclusion 
of sexual violence from peace processes, however, is not exclusive to South Sudan; sexual 
violence is rarely mentioned during the negotiations to resolve conflict. UNIFEM estimates 
that of 300 peace agreements from 45 conflicts since the end of the Cold War, only 10 peace 
processes even mentioned sexual violence, let alone address it as a critical conflict resolution 
item.497 Women also have not been given a platform to actively participate in peacebuilding 
and reconciliation initiatives. As Friederike Bubenzer describes in Hope, Pain and Patience: 
The Lives of Women in South Sudan: 
“The exclusion and marginalisation of women from these processes limits the extent 
to which they are able to voice their concerns and interests, and in turn excludes and 
alienates them from the nation and the state. Given the pivotal role that women play 
in South Sudanese society, this alienation and non-participation runs the risk of 
severely hampering the national healing and reconciliation project that is so vital to 
the building of a prosperous South Sudan. In other words, reconciliation is impossible 
when half of the population is not included in decision-making processes.”498 
Deadly conflicts can be more effectively avoided, and peace can be best forged and sustained, 
when women become equal partners in all aspects of peace-building and conflict prevention, 
when their lives are protected, their experiences considered, and their voices heard. 499 
Education is central to the reconstruction of society and is repeatedly asserted by women as 
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their priority in peacebuilding.500 This was evident in the conversations with the women of the 
Bor Women’s Association, who said (through a translator) “they are not able now to write. 
They are [willing to] go all the distance, they have adult education now, they go to adult 
education. The only this is that if there is anything about the education sector, to give them 
books, to give them opportunities, like [providing] teachers. Teachers are not enough now. So 
they are complaining about the education.”501 Once the members of the Jonglei community 
become educated, some of the long held practices will begin to be challenged and the position 
of women can begin to shift.502 “Education can reconcile a community.”503 
While women in urban areas are beginning to make gains in South Sudan, women in rural 
areas still rarely talk about gender issues or are safely able to begin to question the entrenched 
patriarchal dynamics of society.504 The evolution of women’s roles as peacebuilders and as 
politicians will be impossible without a drastic shift in men’s and women’s attitudes 
regarding gender roles. To this end, Christine Chinkin and Hillary Charlsworth argue that that 
states are responsible to “modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and 
women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other 
practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes 
or on stereotyped roles for men and women”, as required by CEDAW.505 
As women gain more social and political influence, they can play more active roles in 
peacebuilding and continued community development. Due to their gender-specific 
experiences during the conflict, women have “a deep knowledge of the needs and aspirations 
of the local civilian population,” yet they have been, and still are marginalised within South 
Sudanese communities and in formal peacebuilding structures. 506  To redress this, more 
women should be represented fully in all the processes. Sociologist Raewyn Connell in her 
exploration of masculinities has refined the concept of hegemonic masculinity, defining it as 
“the configuration of gender practice” which legitimises patriarchy by “guarantee[ing] … the 
dominant position of men and the subordination of women”. 507  Through this lens, she 
proposes a solution to redress gender imbalances: 
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“If men presently run the governments, armies, and bureaucracies, the solution is 
more access, packing more and more women into the top levels of the state until 
balance is achieved”.508  
South Sudanese women’s organisations have been focusing their efforts on increasing 
women’s participation in political processes, as well as promoting gender-sensitive legislation 
and policies.  Women in conflict zones themselves have a clear idea about peacebuilding in 
their own context.509 Members of the Bor Women’s association in Bor, Jonglei discussed 
what women could do to help end the raids and to bring peace to Jonglei. One woman 
explained the very big role women have as peacebuilders (through a translator):  
 
“People will mobilize themselves to recall, to let them come, we unite, we get settled 
as one, because we are the same state, so we want to have just peace. We call upon 
the one who has taken the side to kill people, we call him for peace, not to fight with 
them. She is saying that we women, we have a very big size in this to make the peace 
around because our children are the ones killing themselves. So [peacebuilding] 
needs to be our duty as women. We unite as one, we mobilize ourselves, we make 
that peace come true because we don't want any killing to go on any more.”510 
Another member described how women can educate their children and their husbands to live 
peacefully, and can unite the communities through inter-communal dialogues with other 
women (through a translator): 
“She replied that she normally, she can start at home, they start at home with the 
family, including husband and children. You tell them about [peace], ‘you don't need 
to fight the other women's children like me. No need of fighting, we are just one.’” 511 
As Jonglei Representative at MoGCSW, Anne Lino Wuor Abyei agreed that peace education 
could start at home, saying “so I strongly feel that if the women know their rights and even if 
they know what is right and what is wrong, then they will educate their children. So its one of 
the things that we were telling them during the conference, that we women can be the greatest 
peacemakers, because we are the ones who form the babies, and we can even fill their minds, 
we can teach them, we can tell them.”512 Abyei also discussed bringing women together, 
separate from men, to discuss peacebuilding and reconciliation, as, according to Geoffrey 
Duke, a roving peace dialogue or exchange program could provide the foundation of trust 
through exposure to different ethnicities and cultures.513 Abyei suggested “we need to start 
also by organizing women’s clubs in different areas, and through those clubs then we could 
exchange [cassette] tapes. For example to bring a voice of a woman crying for her abducted 
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child. So when they hear it that will definitely touch them.” 514  The women at the Bor 
Women’s Association made a similar suggestion: 
“The only thing that can let that [peace] come true is that we unite the women apart 
from men. Apart from men we unite, we work with the ladies of the other language. 
Likewise to the other ladies, you come together. You go from place to the other place, 
if there is facilities of transport; like now water is in the area, [so there is] no way of 
movement, so if there is any possible way that people can fly from the other place to 
the other place, we can make it possible. Even men see that these women are very 
united, what about, we [men] can also be united ourselves. The women of all these 
nations, they are all very tired of war. No one [would] like war to go any longer.”515 
The women-to-women dialogue could be part of the government led peace process, and 
culminate in a Women’s only conference where women would feel comfortable speaking 
freely, says Abyei: 
“The Women’s Association can do a lot of things, although they have meagre 
resources, but even they need to be meeting quite a lot and creating women’s clubs 
and bringing women together. But its my prayers and wish that after the evaluation, 
the peace evaluation, we should also start up an only women’s conference and then to 
work out how we can go about it. There was the chiefs going around after the Jonglei 
peace, the chiefs were going around to start to tell the communities [about 
peacebuilding]. I wish this time women to be going around, to start travelling around, 
from a county to another county. Let’s say the Nuer and Dinka women, and the 
Murle, those who have formed a group to work for peace, and all other women 
concerns, to be moving around, in all the counties and payams and bomas.”516 
However, women’s voice will only be given value in South Sudan when men are also 
engaged. “An initiative targeting the women is very important. But how that participation can 
be guided and maximized is also greatly dependent on how you engage the men in the peace 
process. So if it can be something simultaneous, like the men are also discussing, the women 
also taken. That would be a better approach.”517 Peter Guzulu supports this claim, arguing that 
all people: men, women, and youth; Dinka, Nuer, and Murle should come together to discuss 
the cycle of violence. He believes “the solution of the problem is when people convene and 
agree that it is wrong to do this. It is wrong to attack, it is wrong to kill, it is wrong to abduct, 
it is wrong to rape, it is wrong to do this.”518 Both women and men can also choose not to 
accept raided cows into their home. Biel Boutros Biel recounted a story from one of his 
human rights trainings in Jonglei: “in Lou Nuer, there was only one man, whose son brought 
cows from Murle, and he asked him, ‘where did you bring this cow’, he said he brought it 
from Murle. He said, ‘if you are my son, take that cow back’. And he said that guy cried. And 
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there was no way. He took the cows back to Murle.519 Women also can take a stand against 
raided cattle: 
“When your daughter is married, you know, those who keep cattle, they know each 
others’ cattle. And they know their colours, and they know all these kind of thing. 
Like now, even myself who’s not a cattle keeper, I would know the cattle from my 
area. But you know, you can recognise the Murle breed and the Dinka breed and the 
Nuer breed, from the size, from the horns, form the colours and so on. So we want to 
the ladies to make sure that, if their daughters are to be married with the raided cattle, 
then they should speak up, they say, ‘oh this cattle, it looks like a Murle cattle, it 
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Chapter 7 | Conclusion 
The conflict in Jonglei in driven by complex and interwoven motivations, each of which 
resonates across different social strata. Youth raid cattle for economic gain and for revenge, 
Khartoum funds raiders for political purposes—often revolving around access to oil, and the 
SPLA intervenes to disarm the warring factions, often doing so to the determent of the very 
populations they are meant to protect. Women abducted by warring ethnic groups face years 
of sexual and gender based violence, with little to no legal recourse, due to both lack of 
capacity and to lack of will in a highly patriarchal society. The root causes of the Jonglei 
conflict have not been adequately addressed.  
In March 2012, a Presidential Order was issued setting up an Investigation Committee on 
Jonglei State Crisis.  Professor Deng Awur Wecnyin was named to head the seven-member 
committee, whose mandate is “to investigate the root causes of the violence; establish the 
extent of damage to lives and property; reveal those inside or outside South Sudan involved in 
‘fanning and influencing the youths in order to cause atrocities’; investigate the sources of 
funding and supplies to the youth; and propose actions to prevent similar occurrences in the 
future.” 521  Although the Committee was tasked to present its report within three months of 
the issuing of the order, as of November 2013, no investigations had been carried out.  
The National Committee for Healing, Peace and Reconciliation is working to renew 
traditional mechanisms of reconciliation through people-to-people conferences. According to 
Archbishop Deng:  
“Formally our people have a way where the elders of a community used to come 
whenever there is a problem, and they sit down and discuss the issues, so that they 
can resolve the issues. [As a result of the discussions] they come to a conclusion, [and 
decide on the amount of reparations to be paid to the victim through a payment of 
“blood compensation” in cattle], and we call it ‘justice’. They feel that the justice has 
been done … Then, when they are together, they have to kill a bull. And that bull will 
be shared by the whole community as a sign of a treaty that that thing should never 
happen again.” 522 
Although the youth involved in the most violent outbreak—the Nuer Youth White Army—
has appealed for youth-to-youth dialogue outside South Sudan, this has not taken place, and 
instead peace and reconciliation processes have involved chiefs and older leaders whose 
authority does not resonate with the youth who are fighting. These peace processes have not 
been successful in that there has been no cessation in the cycle of violence. Rather, the 
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violence has reached extreme levels, and women are used as pawns for revenge and 
retaliation. 
While bringing people together for truth-telling and dialogue can begin to disarm their minds, 
this is difficult to do without adequate roads and infrastructure. Sadly, lack of development 
will continue to hinder peacebuilding activities in Jonglei with no infrastructure in place.  
“As long as [there is] no development and no change of the issues touching their real 
life, nothing will change. As far as I know, it is just seen as talk of the people of the 
towns. So nothing will change. Services must be delivered to them. Let them see the 
reality of a hospital, let them engage in some tangible work. Even if you give them 
agricultural activates, the young men would be happy to do, they will get something, 
divert them from the issue of war. Because at the moment this is the real that I said 
before. They are doing this for survival. If you don't divert their attention from those 
things, they will always go back. Because going to Murle, getting 10 cows, you sell 
them, you are rich overnight. Coming to Nuer land, taking one child, you sell, you are 
rich overnight. It has become a business.”523 
Says Aguti Adut, “What can bring peace to Jonglei is only roads. If you build roads, peace 
will just come by itself.”524 
With or without roads, peace will be difficult to achieve without reconciliation; deep forms of 
social reconciliation and transformation are needed in South Sudan to redress social injustice 
as well as the traumatic events that transpired during the civil war. According to Archbishop 
Daniel Deng Bul, Chairperson of the National Committee for Healing, Peace, and 
Reconciliation, “Because of the war, [South Sudanese] lost their way…Long ago they loved 
each other … and we want to bring that back to their life. What we are trying to do is present 
to them … certain parts of the tradition, so we are trying to teach them how to revive their 
tradition, so that they can solve some of the problems.” 525 
For South Sudan to begin to heal from decades of civil war, people must begin to focus on 
points of mutual interest rather than disagreement. Through inclusive, open dialogue, people 
from different ethnic groups can begin building mutual trust, and recognizing their 
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Map: Murle villages in Jonglei527 
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Wunlit Recommendations on Abductions 
Girls who have been abducted but are not yet married. 
 Resolution: to be repatriated to their parents or guardians as soon as they are identified. 
Girls who have been Married in Captivity 
 As soon as they are identified they should be asked by their parents if they want to 
remain with their husbands. 
 If the woman declares that she wants to remain with her husband, than the bride price 
must be collected and presented to her natural parents. 
 If she desires to return to her natural parents or guardians she is to be repatriated. The 
question that remains concerns her children. 
 These children can be redeemed by their natural father according to Dinka traditions. 
 Girls married to soldiers on either side presents another question. If the woman is 
identified with a soldier on the SPLA side, she should be sent to Commander Selva Kiir 
Mayardit so that the girl is able to state before her parents whether she wants to remain 
with her soldier-husband return to her family or not. 
 If she wants to return to her parents, then she must go. The question that remains 
concerns the children she has given birth to. 
 Whether she has a single child or several may be redeemed by the natural father (a 
soldier), according to the custom of the Dinka. 
 The opposite is also true. If the father refuses to redeem the children, the mother is free 
to leave with them. 
 If the girl is found in USDF governed territory, a letter must be written to Commander 
Riak Machar, and the same process holds true. (You may ask why we write to Selva Kiir 
rather than John Garang; and you write to rather than to Riak Machar. Some days ago 
you saw Selva Kiir at the opening f our meetings here as the man responsible for Bahr el 
Ghazal. 
Married Women Abducted into Captivity 
 As soon as a woman in this category is identified she should be repatriated to her home 
area with all her children born in captivity. 
 The man who took the abducted woman as his wife in the alien land shall be fined for 
adultery in accordance with the custom in the area where the woman was 
discovered. (this practice, called akor, is a particularly serious violation, and must be 
seriously punished. The taking of women must be strongly discouraged. The practice 
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